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INTRODUCTION

Possession, the old saying goes, is nine-tenths of the law. This article is intended to be a practical guide to the other one-tenth-the law
of taking possession. Accordingly, it covers the effect of recovering
possession on a landlord's claims for rent and damages, the procedures governing forcible detainer proceedings in Texas, and the selfhelp alternatives to this statutory form of judicial eviction.
The need for such a guide is not immediately apparent. The Texas
legislature intended forcible detainer proceedings to be "a summary,
speedy, and inexpensive remedy for the determination of who is entitled to possession of the premises." 1 Sometimes they are. But, more
often, vigorously contested forcible detainer proceedings are anything
but simple, fast, and cheap.' And unfortunately, determining the effect of a forcible detainer judgment on the parties' other remedies can
be surprisingly complex.
Much of this complexity results, ironically, from the legislature's attempt to keep forcible detainer proceedings simple. When the legislature gave Texas's justice courts exclusive jurisdiction over forcible
detainer actions,3 it also limited the issues that can be raised in them.4
1. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984) (citing Scott v.
Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1936)).
2. See, e.g., Fandey v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1994, writ
denied) (noting that forcible detainer action, which court of appeals decided over four
years after it was filed in justice court, and which generated an 1107 page transcript in
county court, was "anything but summary, speedy, and inexpensive.").
3. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (stating that
justice court has original jurisdiction in cases of forcible entry and detainer); Act of
June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 1 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.004) (availablevia Internet at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us) (stating that "[a] justice court in the precinct in which the real property is located has jurisdiction in evic-
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Thus, immediate possession of the premises is the only issue properly
before the justice court in a forcible detainer action, unless an action

for past due rent within the jurisdictional limits of the justice court is
joined with the suit for possession.5 This means that a landlord may
not assert in justice court claims for past due rent in excess of $5,000
or for any amount of unaccrued rent or damages.6 Likewise, a tenant
cannot assert any counterclaims in an eviction suit in justice court.7
Moreover, the issues that the parties may raise in an appeal from
justice court are also limited. In an appeal the prevailing party may
only recover damages relating to maintaining or obtaining possession.8 These damages ordinarily are limited to the reasonable rental
value of the premises between the date of the judgment in justice
court and the disposition of the appeal, plus reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in justice and county court.9 Any damages unrelated to maintaining or defending possession must be brought in a second suit filed in a district or county court having jurisdiction over the
tion suits. Eviction suits include forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer
suits.").
4. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (stating that
justice court has original jurisdiction of civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is
not exclusively in district or county court and in which the amount in controversy is
not more than $5,000, exclusive of interest); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 738 (stating that
suit for rent may be joined with action for forcible entry and detainer if suit for rent is
within monetary jurisdiction of justice court).
5. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 738 (stating that suit for rent may be joined with forcible
detainer action); TEX. R. Civ. P. 746 (declaring that possession is only issue before
justice
in forcible detainer action).
6. court
See Haginas
v. Malbis Mem'l Found., 349 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1961), affid, 354 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. 1962) (stating that landlord may recover only rent, as such, in forcible detainer action in justice court but not damages
for wrongful withholding of the premises); Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) (stating that Rule 738 does not permit landlord to
join with forcible detainer action in justice court damage claims for wrongful withholding of premises or for other benefits accruing under contract).
7. See Grayson v. Rodermund, 135 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1939, no writ) (holding that tenant could not assert counterclaim against landlord in
forcible detainer action because possession is only issue to be tried); John E. Morrison
Co. v. Harrell, 148 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1912, no writ) (stating
that defendant in forcible detainer proceeding could not assert counterclaim, which
exceeded justice court's jurisdiction, for value of its services to offset plaintiff's suit for
rent); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 746 (stating that actual possession is only issue to be
tried in forcible entry and detainer or forcible entry action).
8. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 752 (stating that either party to an appeal may "plead,
prove and recover his damages, if any, suffered for withholding or defending the
premises during the pendency of the appeal"); Rushing v. Smith, 630 S.W.2d 498, 499500 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ) (holding that tenant was not entitled to recover, in appeal of forcible detainer suit, damages for value of his labor or expenses
incurred planting crops on leasehold before receiving notice to vacate).
9. See, e.g., Hart v. Keller Props., 567 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, no writ); Stewart v. Breese, 367 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,
writ dism'd); Snyder v. Tousinau, 177 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1944, no writ); Koelzer v. Pizzirani, 718 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986,
no writ) (applying same damage measure in forcible entry and detainer case).
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amount in controversy.'" In this unique jurisdictional scheme, one
court rarely has jurisdiction to resolve a ,dispute between a landlord
and a tenant over both money and possession.
Any misstep in this jurisdictional minefield along the road to an
eviction can be costly. Even though pursuing a forcible detainer action is supposed to be cumulative of a landlord's other remedies, l '
doing so inadvertently may impair them,12 despite the supposedly limited preclusive effect of suits tried in justice court. 3 Moreover, a judgment for possession in a forcible detainer action will not, as commonly
believed, bar a tenant's claim for wrongful eviction.' 4 Thus, a landlord
may succeed in recovering possession in justice court only to find itself
ordered by another court to pay damages to its former tenant because
the justice court wrongfully ordered the eviction. 5 And, in some circumstances, a judgment for possession in justice court will not prevent
a district court from restoring possession to a tenant after a justice
court orders an eviction.' 6 This article tries to chart these and other
mines in the forcible detainer minefield and to give directions to some
of the paths around that minefield.
Those paths, however, are few and often stop short of the intended
destination. One, the Texas lock-out statute, is the principal self-help
alternative to judicial eviction. 7 And while locking-out a tenant can
prevent a tenant who is delinquent in paying rent from going into the
10. See Rushing, 630 S.W.2d at 500 (citing Holcombe v. Lorino, 79 S.W.2d 307, 309
(Tex. 1935)).
11. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. 1984) (stating that forcible detainer action is cumulative of other remedies); Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg.
R.S., S.B. 1678, § 6 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008) ("An eviction
[A forcible entry and detainer su it or ; forcible detainer] suit does not bar a suit for
trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.").
12. See Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ) (illustrating some jurisdictional and preclusion issues raised by joining action for
rent in forcible detainer suit).
13. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.004(a) (Vernon 1997) ("A judgment or determination of fact or law in a proceeding in a lower trial court is not res
judicata and is not a basis for estoppel by judgment in a proceeding in a district court,
except that a judgment rendered in a lower trial court is binding on the parties thereto
as to recovery or denial of recovery."); McCloud v. Knapp, 507 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (holding that tenant's claims for damages for breach
of oral lease agreement were not barred by adverse forcible detainer judgment in
justice court because those issues were not actually, litigated).
14. See Anarkali Enters., Inc. v. Riverside Drive Enters., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 25, 2627 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
15. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 6 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008 ("An eviction [A forci ble entry and detainer suit or a
forcible detainer] suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne
profits.").
16. Cf.Buttery v. Bush, 575 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that judgment for immediate possession in justice court did not
preclude declaratory judgment action in district court to determine who was entitled
to ultimate possession of premises under lease renewal option).
17. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93002 (Vernon 1995).
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premises, or sometimes can bring that tenant to the bargaining table,
it is of little use in removing a tenant who does not want to leave the
premises. This statutory self-help remedy, like the contractual selfhelp remedy for retaking possession in most leases, cannot be used if
doing so would breach the peace.' 8 Thus, if a tenant says, "I'm not
leaving," the landlord should stop a self-help eviction. Another path
around the forcible detainer minefield is self-help repossession of a
tenant's personal property. Article 9 of the Texas UCC and most
leases authorize a landlord to take possession of a tenant's personal
property in order to enforce a contractual landlord's lien. 19 But a tenant can cut-off a landlord's use of this remedy by merely saying to a
landlord, "Don't touch my stuff."2° In spite of their limitations, these
self-help alternatives to judicial eviction are sometimes useful to a
landlord who must evict a tenant or dispose of a tenant's personal
property.
I.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS

A. Negotiating With Delinquent Tenants
Negotiations can be the least costly and most effective way for a
landlord to resolve a dispute with a delinquent tenant. But missteps in
negotiations with a delinquent tenant can seriously impair a landlord's
remedies. In Glasscock v. Console Drive Joint Venture,"' the landlord
negotiated a repayment plan with the tenant, but the landlord partially released the guarantor of the lease by accepting a note from the

tenant for the past due rent. 2 In Gill Savings Ass'n v. Chair King,
Inc., the tenant successfully asserted wrongful eviction and fraud
claims based on the landlord's conduct during negotiations about the
tenant's non-payment of rent.23
18. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, writ dism'd); Embry v. Bel-Aire Corp., 508 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("One who is entitled to possession of land, but who is
not in possession, may not forcibly take possession from another.").
19. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Vernon 1991) (stating that "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the
collateral.").
20. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595, 602-04 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (stating that Texas does not recognize
right to self-help repossession of mortgaged real estate and that self-help repossession
of personal property is permitted only if it can be done without breach of peace); see
generally MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 152-54 (Tex. 1992) (holding that
creditor has non-delegable duty not to breach peace and that creditor breached peace
when its subcontractor repossessed collateral over objections of debtor); Giese v.
NCNB Texas Forney Banking Ctr., 881 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no
writ) (stating that unreasonable damage to property constitutes breach of peace).
21. 675 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. See Glasscock, 675 S.W.2d at 592.

23. See Gill Savs. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989), affd in part and modified in part per curiam, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.
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The facts in Gill Savings Ass'n are instructive. Claiming that the
landlord failed to repair defects in the premises, the tenant notified
the landlord that it regarded this failure as a breach of the lease and
that, as a result, it would withhold payment of rent. The tenant offered
to place the rent into an escrow account, and the landlord agreed to
the escrow arrangement. But for some reason, the escrow account
was never established.24
Meanwhile, temptation in the form of Toys 'R' Us, a national credit
tenant, visited the landlord. Unfortunately, its troublesome, delinquent tenant occupied the only space in the shopping center suitable
to Toys 'R' Us. The landlord asked the president of its troublesome
tenant to relocate to comparable space in the same shopping center so
that the landlord could enter into a lease with Toys 'R' Us. While
negotiations for the comparable space were ongoing, the tenant received a letter demanding payment of the delinquent rent. The tenant's president claimed a representative of the landlord told him not
to worry about the demand letter. The tenant's president then rejected an offer from the landlord for the substitute space, and he left
town for a week, believing negotiations with the landlord for substitute space would continue. In his absence, the landlord hired a moving company and evicted the tenant. The landlord, of course, claimed
the tenant should have known it would be evicted because the landlord had told the tenant's president, before he left town, that "other
alternatives would have to be considered" if the tenant rejected the
landlord's offer. 5
In a non-jury trial, the trial court found the landlord liable for
$144,309 in actual damages, $355,277 in punitive damages, 6 and
$54,862 in attorneys' fees.2 7 The trial court also ruled that the landlord's conduct during these negotiations estopped the landlord from
asserting any right to recover rent. 8 The court of appeals and the
Texas Supreme Court both affirmed the trial court's liability findings,
although the damage awards were ultimately remanded for a new
trial.2 9 In any case, the landlord's apparently cavalier attitude toward
commitments it made or implied during settlement negotiations with a
non-paying tenant turned this eviction into protracted litigation and a
financial disaster.
1990), on remand sub nom., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chair King, Inc., 827 S.W.2d
546 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
24. See Gill Says. Ass'n, 783 S.W.2d at 676.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 680.
28. See id. at 679.
29. See id. at 682 (affirming trial court's judgment on liability, modifying award of
attorneys' fees, and remanding for new trial on damages), affd in part and modified in
part per curiam, 797 S.W.2d at 32-33 (affirming judgment on liability, reinstating trial
court's award of attorneys' fees, and remanding for new trial on damages).
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Deciding to Evict

A landlord should make the decision to pursue an eviction only after carefully considering its business objectives, its legal options, and
the risks and costs associated with pursuing each of those options.
Before beginning the lease enforcement process, a landlord should
also review its dealings with its tenant to uncover, if possible, any areas of potential liability exposure. Ordinarily, the landlord or its attorney should examine any correspondence with the tenant, the lease,
any lease amendments, guaranties, UCC filings, subleases and assignments, subordination, attornment, or non-disturbance agreements,
and the landlord's loan agreements. The failure to conduct such a review is a source of many common missteps in the lease enforcement
process, including perhaps the most common-failing to send proper
notices to all of the parties entitled to receive them. 30 An appropriate
review of these materials and a probing interview of its property manager should put a landlord in a far better position to choose the remedies, or combination of remedies, which will most effectively
accomplish its legitimate business objectives.
C.

Common Law Remedies for Breach

At common law, a landlord's remedies for a tenant's breach were
quite limited. Most covenants in a real property lease, including the
promise to pay rent,3 a to advertise a business with a percentage rent
clause,32 to improve the premises, 33 to repair the leasehold, 34 not to
30. See, e.g., Gill Says. Ass'n, 783 S.W.2d at 676 (noting that landlord failed to
send notice of tenant's default to tenant's creditor as required by agreement subordinating landlord's lien to creditor's lien on tenant's inventory).
31. See Buffalo Pipeline Co. v. Bell, 694 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that landlord did not have common law right to
terminate lease because tenant failed to pay rent); Shepherd v. Sorrells, 182 S.W.2d
1009, 1011-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ) (stating that breach of covenant to pay rent does not breed "forfeiture of possession" by tenant or right of possession by landlord); Dillingham v. Williams, 165 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (holding that landlord did not have common law right to
terminate lease because tenant failed to pay rent).
32. See G.C. Murphy Co. v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853, 857-60 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that lease covenants should be construed to avoid forfeiture, court of civil appeals reversed summary judgment for forfeiture in favor of landlord because tenant's alleged breach of covenant to spend three
percent of its gross sales on advertising could be construed to avoid forfeiture).
33. See Foster v. L.M.S. Dev. Co., 346 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that landlord could not terminate ground lease covering part of land upon which Mercantile Building in downtown Dallas was located
after tenant failed to complete improvements within time required by lease because
covenant to improve premises ordinarily is treated as an independent covenant, unless the "intention to create a conditional estate is clearly and unequivocally revealed
by the language of the instrument.").
34. See Reavis v. Taylor, 162 S.W.2d 1030, 1032-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (holding that landlord could not terminate lease when tenant
failed to repair fences because covenant to repair ordinarily is not a condition prece-
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alter the leasehold,35 and to record, and presumably not to record, the
lease,36 were regarded as independent covenants,37 meaning that a
tenant's failure to perform them generally did not excuse the landlord
from honoring the covenant of quiet enjoyment. As a consequence, a
landlord did not have the right at common law to reenter the premises, to terminate the lease, or to recover damages for unaccrued rentals when a tenant failed to pay rent, unless the lease provided the
landlord with these remedies or the tenant committed an anticipatory
breach of the lease. 38 Even a tenant's use of the premises for an illegal purpose ordinarily did not allow a landlord to terminate the
lease.39
1. Landlord's Legal Remedies for Breach

In the absence of an anticipatory breach or an express contractual
remedy, a landlord, at common law, could (i) treat the contract as
binding (i.e., continue to recognize the tenant's right to occupancy and
sue for rent as it came due through the earlier of the termination or
surrender of the lease or the date of trial), (ii) sue to cancel the lease
and repossess the premises, or (iii) in the event the tenant failed to
perform any covenant other than the covenant to pay rent, sue for any
40
damages resulting from the tenant's breach.

2. Equitable Remedies
In addition to these common law legal remedies, a landlord could
seek equitable relief as a means to enforce certain of its tenant's oblident to landlord's obligations to tenant, and, as a result, tenant's breach does not
authorize landlord to terminate lease unless lease expressly grants this remedy to
landlord).
35. See Parham v. Glass Club Lake, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Tex. Civ. AppTexarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that landlord could not terminate lease because tenant violated covenant not to fence off lake on leasehold).
36. See Parten v. Cannon, 829 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied) (holding that tenant's failure to properly record oil and gas lease, which constituted breach of express covenant, did not give rise to forfeiture).
37. See Davidow v. Inwood N. Professional Group - Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 375
(Tex. 1988) (citing 3 G. Thompson, THOMPSON ON REAL ESTATE §§ 1110, 1115 (1980)
for proposition that, at common law, "[a]ll lease covenants were therefore considered
independent" and explaining significance of conveyancing as rationale for independent covenants); Cantile v. Vanity Fair Properties, 505 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing historical basis for treating covenants in leases as independent covenants).
38. See supra footnotes 31-37.
39. See Moore v. Kirgan, 250 S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1952, no
writ); cf Salpas v. State, 642 S.W.2d 71, 72-73 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ)
(holding that, in appeal of criminal conviction for possession of drugs seized in leased
mini-warehouse, landlord peaceably entered warehouse after tenant failed to pay rent
and, therefore, landlord could lawfully allow police to enter premises).
40. See Buffalo Pipeline Co. v. Bell, 694 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Walling v. Christie & Hobby, Inc., 54 S.W.2d 186, 188
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1932, no writ).
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gations. Unfortunately, obtaining equitable relief is sometimes difficult and almost always expensive. Specific enforcement of a tenant's
obligations is rarely available because courts are unwilling to order,
and then monitor, continuous activity over an extended period of
time.4 ' Moreover, to obtain injunctive relief, a party must prove that
(i) it has a probable right to prevail on the merits; (ii) it has suffered,
or will suffer, immediate and irreparable harm; and (iii) it has no adequate remedy at law.42 Given these limitations, equitable relief is
often unavailable or impractical.
3. Drafting Considerations
Careful drafting, however, can increase the chances of obtaining injunctive relief to enforce continuous operations clauses, radius restrictions, and other such covenants. 43 The well-drafted lease should
include evidentiary stipulations in which the tenant admits that breach
of these covenants will cause immediate and irreparable harm; that
the landlord will not have an adequate remedy at law; that the tenant
will not suffer damages if injunctive relief is granted; and that setting
bond in a minimal amount will be sufficient to cover any damages
suffered by the tenant if the court wrongfully orders temporary injunctive relief.
Or, instead of relying exclusively on the availability of injunctive
relief, consider using liquidated damage clauses specifically tailored
to compensate the landlord for breach of important covenants. A liquidated damage clause may provide a landlord with an effective remedy when termination of the tenant's lease is not 'feasible or when
money damages (e.g., reduced percentage rentals paid by other tenants in a shopping center when a solvent anchor tenant ceases operations) are difficult to estimate or prove.
D.

Four (Now Three) Common Law Remedies for Anticipatory
Breach

The decision to evict should be made with the understanding that
retaking possession invariably will affect a landlord's common law or
contractual monetary remedies.
41. See Canteen Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Props., Inc., 773 S.W.2d 398, 400-01
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (affirming, in suit brought to enforce continuous
operation clause, portion of judgment that enjoined tenant from maintaining vending
machine operation but reversing portion of judgment that ordered tenant to continuously operate restaurant as required by lease).
42. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 680, 683.
43. See Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops, 281 S.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1955, writ ref'd) (holding that percentage rent clause in lease did not imply
obligation to operate premises continuously during lease term in manner that would
produce percentage rent in excess of minimum guaranteed rental); Palm v. Mortgage
Inv. Co., 229 S.W.2d 869, 873-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(refusing to imply covenant of continuous operations in commercial lease).
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1. Anticipatory Breach
Any combination of words or conduct by which the tenant "unconditionally repudiates liability for further performance," may constitute
an anticipatory breach of a lease." Anticipatory breach usually falls
into one of two categories. A tenant may commit an anticipatory
breach by expressly repudiating its own obligations, thus forfeiting its
rights under the lease.45 Or a tenant may commit an anticipatory
breach by failing to pay rent and abandoning the leased premises.4 6
2.

Remedies for Anticipatory Breach

In Speedee Mart, Inc. v. Stovall,4 7 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
identified what it called the four "common law remedies" available to
the landlord upon a tenant's anticipatory breach:
(a) the landlord could decline to repossess, elect instead to keep
the lease in full force and effect, and sue month to month for contractual rent as it comes due;
(b) the landlord could treat the tenant's conduct as an anticipatory breach, repossess the property for its own purposes, and recover the present value of future lease payments less the reasonable
market value of the lease for its unexpired term;
(c) the landlord could treat the tenant's conduct as an anticipatory breach, repossess the premises, relet to another tenant for the
benefit of the original tenant, and recover from the original tenant
the difference between the rent under the original lease and the rent
under the new lease; or
(d) the landlord could declare the lease forfeited, thus relieving
the tenant of the obligation to pay future rent.48
The first option-suing on the lease-is no longer available in most
cases in light of the Texas Supreme Court's recognition of a landlord's
duty to mitigate its damages and the 1997 legislature's addition of a
duty to mitigate to the Texas Property Code. Because Texas law already imposed the substantial equivalent of a duty to mitigate once a
landlord elected to reenter the premises,4 9 the supreme court's an-

.44. See Miller v. Vineyard, 765 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
denied) (citing Wukasch v. Hoover, 247 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1952), affid, 254 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1953)).
45. See Wukasch, 247 S.W.2d at 597 (holding that letter sent to landlord after tenant abandoned the leased premises, which stated tenant would no longer pay rent,
constituted anticipatory breach).
46. See Early v. Isaacson, 31 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ
ref'd).
47. 664 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
48. See Speedee Mart, 664 S.W.2d at 177; see also Lakeside Leasing Corp. v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park Phase 3, 750 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ) (listing first three Speedee Mart remedies as among those "traditionally available" at Texas common law and citing Speedee Mart and other decisions).
49. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Edwards, 96 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd) (explaining that landlord had the right, after the breach
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nouncement of a duty to mitigate should have little effect on a landlord's three other remedies.
a.

Option No. 1: MaintainingLease Replaced by Duty to Mitigate

Under the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Austin Hill Country
Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc.,"° a landlord no longer has the option, which was available at common law after a tenant abandoned the
premises, 51 to maintain the lease in force (or, from a tenant's perspective, sit on its haunches), without any obligation to relet, and then sue
"on the lease" for each installment of rent as it came due.5" This decision imposes on a landlord a duty to mitigate its damages, whether or
not it actually reenters the premises, if the lease allows the landlord to
reenter the premises without terminating the lease or accepting surrender of the premises.5 3
of the contract and abandonment of the premises by tenant, to sue for damages measured by "the difference between the contract price for the whole period and such
sum as they may have received by way of rentals from third parties, after the use of
due diligence to obtain tenants.") (emphasis added); White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267,
270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ). The White court stated,
Where the tenant abandons the premises, the lessor, as one remedy, may
accept the breach by the tenant, retake possession and sue for his damages.
If he elects this remedy and has relet the premises for the entire unexpired
term, the measure of lessor's damage is generally the difference between the
rental originally contracted for and that realized from the reletting.
Id. (citation omitted). Or if the landlord chose not to relet, it could sue for damages
measured by "the difference between the present value of the rentals contracted for in
the lease and the reasonable cash market value of the lease for its unexpired term."
Id. See also Stewart v. Kuskin & Rotberg, Inc., 106 S.W.2d 1074, 1075 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1937, no writ) (stating that landlord was not entitled to recover
damages under contractual reenter and relet clause because landlord failed to show
the amount of rents paid by the tenant or the respective months occupied by him, the
amounts it received on reletting, the items and necessity for any repairs, and the diligence and efforts made to relet the premises).
50. 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997).
51. See Marathon Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d at 551-52 (explaining that, at common law,
"[a landlord] had the right to decline to meddle with the property, to take possession,
or to lease it to other parties and wait until the end of the term stated in the lease and
then sue for rent, but they were not driven to that course. The law did not require
them to run the risk of damages to the property, and the insolvency of the tenants
52. Compare Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 299 (holding that
landlord cannot maintain lease in force without reletting) with Shepherd v. Sorrells,
182 S.W.2d 1009, 1011-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ) (stating that landlord had right to maintain lease in force and sue for each installment of future rent as
it came due); Walling v. Christie & Hobby, Inc., 54 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1932, no writ) (stating that landlord had right to maintain lease in force and
sue for each installment of future rent as it came due); Davidson v. Hirsch, 101 S.W.
269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ) (stating that suit for rent is suit on contract not suit
for damages for breach of contract).
53. Compare Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 300 (stating that
actual reentry or right of reentry in lease creates obligation to mitigate) with Marathon Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d at 552 (explaining that landlord, although not obligated to do
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But Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. is only the first word on the
subject of a landlord's duty to mitigate. Before the supreme court
published its second opinion in Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., the
legislature added a duty to mitigate to the Texas Property Code.5 4
This statute applies to leases entered into on or after September 1,
1997;55 it declares void any lease provision purporting to waive a right
or exempt a landlord from a liability under the statute 56 and purports

to obligate a landlord to mitigate its damages anytime a tenant abandons the premises in violation of the lease.5 7 It does not, however,

expressly adopt the exception to the duty to mitigate announced in
Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. for leases without a contractual right
of reentry. 58 The Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. decision and the

mitigation statute are discussed in the section on a tenant's defenses.
b.

Option No. 2: Reenter and Hold the Premises

A landlord may elect to treat the tenant's conduct as an anticipatory
breach, accept the tenant's repudiation of the lease, repossess the
property for the landlord's own purposes without reletting or attempting to do so, and recover the present value of future lease payments
less the reasonable market value of the premises for the unexpired
term. 59 Even though this option does not require a landlord to actually exercise any diligence to relet the premises,6 ° the credit given to

the tenant for the fair market value of the lease term serves as a reasonable estimate of the amount that the landlord would have received
by reletting had the landlord exercised reasonable diligence.61

so, "had the right.., after the breach of the contract and abandonment of the premises by [tenant], to sue for compensation for the injury sustained .... ").
54. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006).
55. See id. § 16(a).
56. See id. § 8 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b)).
57. See id. § 8 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(a)).
58. Compare Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 299 with Act of June
20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 91.006).
59. See White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no
writ); see also Thomas v. Morrison, 537 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Warncke v. Tarbutton, 449 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Employment Advisors, Inc. v. Sparks, 364
S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 368 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. 1963); John Church Co. v. Martinez, 204 S.W. 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1918, writ ref'd).
60. See White, 385 S.W.2d at 270.
61. See id. ("[Tjhe measure of damages is the difference between the present value
of the rentals contracted for in the lease and the reasonable cash market value of the
lease for its unexpired term.").
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Option No. 3: Reenter and Relet

A landlord may elect to treat its tenant's conduct as an anticipatory
breach, accept repudiation of the lease, repossess the premises, relet
to another tenant for the benefit of the original tenant, and recover
from the original tenant the present value of the difference between
the rent under the original lease and the rent received and to be received under the new lease. 62 The measure of damages is the principal, but not the only, difference between the landlord's option to
reenter and hold (Option No. 2) and its option to reenter and relet the
premises (Option No. 3).
d.

Option No. 4: Declare a Forfeiture

A landlord may declare the lease forfeited, thus relieving the tenant
of the obligation to pay future rent, and sue for any unpaid rent that
accrued before the forfeiture.6 3 If a landlord terminates the lease, it
may recover any unpaid rent due before termination, but not any
damages for rent that otherwise would have accrued after the termination date, unless the lease expressly permits such a recovery.64
E. Landlord's ContractualRemedies
Carefully negotiated and well-drafted default and remedies provisions not only can close many of the loopholes in a landlord's common
law remedies but also can make the enforcement process less time
consuming, more predictable, and less expensive. Although the parties' right to craft default and remedies provisions in a lease is broad,
it is not unlimited. 65 Thus, even though a lease states that the landlord's remedies are both alternative and cumulative, a court may limit
the landlord's ability to exercise cumulative remedies if they are
"clearly inconsistent" or would "permit[ ] the lessor a measure of re' 66
covery far in excess of just 'compensation.'
62. See id. ("Where the tenant abandons the premises, the lessor, as one remedy,
may accept the breach by the tenant, retake possession and sue for his damages. If he
elects this remedy and has relet the premises for the entire unexpired term, the measure of lessor's damage is generally the difference between the rental originally contracted for and that realized from the reletting.").
63. See Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 349 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. 1961).
64. See id.
65. See Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1952).
66. See American Lease Plan v. Ben-Kro Corp., 508 S.W.2d 937, 943 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding, in a case involving a personal property lease, that landlord could elect to treat tenant's failure to pay rent as
continuing breach and sue on lease for monthly rental payments or treat it as an
anticipatory breach and sue for damages but that landlord could not repossess leased
property and sue for unaccrued rents as they came due).
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1. Forfeiture or Termination
A landlord may terminate a lease pursuant to an express forfeiture
provision.6 7 Forfeiture is a contractual remedy distinct from the equitable remedy of recission:
[A] forfeiture is a penalty provided by the terms of the agreement for
the breach of a covenant in the agreement. Recission, on the other
hand, is an equitable remedy that terminates the agreement by force
of law and is independent of any provision of the agreement. The
practical effect is the same: the tenant's obligation to pay rent ends
at the time of forfeiture or rescission. A corollary of this rule is that
the tenant's
obligation to pay rent continues until such an event
68
occurs.

If a landlord successfully terminates the lease, the landlord relinquishes any right to recover future rents as if the termination date
were "the day originally fixed ... for the expiration of the term" of
the lease6 9 and the tenant loses its right to possession.
It is often said, however, that the law "abhors a forfeiture."70 Thus,
"if there is any doubt as to the meaning of the language in a lease[,]

then the uncertainty would be resolved against the lessor to prevent a
forfeiture."71 Courts will sometimes invoke principles of equity to relieve a tenant of a forfeiture, even though the terms of the lease seem
to allow one.7 2

2.

Reentry and Reletting

Commercial leases usually provide that the landlord may reenter
the premises and relet for the account of, or as agent for, the tenant,
without terminating the lease. A well-drafted reentry and reletting

clause should, at a minimum, specify how any actual or promised pay67. See Rohrt, 349 S.W.2d at 97-98.
68. Miller v. Vineyard, 765 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied)
(citation omitted).
69. Rohrt, 349 S.W.2d at 97-98.
70. G.C. Murphy Co. v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus

Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

71. Id. at 856 (reversing summary judgment enforcing forfeiture because term
"advertising" in clause that required tenant to spend three percent of its gross sales on
advertising could have been construed more broadly to avoid forfeiture); see also
Parten v. Cannon, 829 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied) (citing
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989)).
72. See Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kaiser, 723 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d 265,
272 (Tex. 1939) which states that "[i]n cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition
precedent of a lease, which do not fall within accident or mistake, equity will relieve
when the delay has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant
relief would result in such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable to
enforce literally the condition precedent of the lease."). But see Reynolds-Penland
Co. v. Hexter & Lobello, 567 S.W.2d 237, 239-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
dism'd by agr.) (stating that equity will not intervene to prevent a forfeiture and that
neglect is not grounds for waiving a condition precedent).
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ments from a substitute tenant will be credited against unpaid rent
and other sums due under the original lease. If, for example, a landlord relets the premises over only a portion of the remaining term, but
at a rental rate higher than that stipulated in the defaulting tenant's
lease, should the excess rent be credited to the tenant's liability and, if
so, how? One court of appeals facing this question did not require the
landlord to credit the excess rents from reletting in one period against
a deficiency in another period. v3 But the result may not be the same
after Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc.
a.

"But not the Obligation, to Relet"

The time to retire this familiar phrase in most lease forms has come.
It is void in any lease entered into after September 1, 19977 And if
left in new leases, its only effect will be to mislead some poor landlord,
who has been too busy managing his property to keep up with the
latest legal developments, into believing that he is free of any duty to
mitigate.
b.

"By Force if Necessary"

Many commercial leases purport to authorize a landlord to reenter
the premises "by force if necessary, and without liability for any act or
omission of the landlord or its agents in connection with such reentry." Retaining this familiar phrase in lease forms may be hazardous.
The phrase does not mean what many landlords believe it does-a
landlord cannot reenter or repossess the premises if doing so will
breach the peace." And, in all probability, a landlord who tries will
be held liable for any damages caused in the attempt.
3.

Liquidated Damage Clauses

Well-drafted liquidated damage clauses can be of great practical
benefit to a landlord, provided that they do not constitute a penalty.
As the Texas Supreme Court explained:
The right of competent parties to make their own bargains is not
unlimited. The universal rule for measuring damages for the breach
of a contract is just compensation for the loss or damage actually
sustained. By the operation of that rule a party generally should be
73. See Maida v. Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648, 652-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1971, no writ) (awarding landlord unpaid rents, less proceeds of reletting,
through date of trial, plus renovation costs associated with reletting).
74. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, §§ 8, 16 (to be codified at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b)); see also Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Tex. 1997) (holding that commercial landlord has duty to mitigate).
75. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, writ dism'd); Embry v. Bel-Aire Corp., 508 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[O]ne who is entitled to possession of land, but who is not in
possession, may not forcibly take possession from another."). See also infra note 368.
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awarded neither less nor more than his actual damages. A party has
no right to have a court enforce
a stipulation which violates the
76
principle underlying that rule.
Any "stipulation" in a contract, not just a rental acceleration clause or
a provision labeled "Liquidated Damages," may violate the principle
of just compensation. As a consequence, the default and remedies
provisions in lease forms should be reviewed to assess the risk that
one or more of the landlord's stipulated remedies may allow the landlord to recover more
than "just compensation for the loss or damage
77
actually sustained.,

a.

Test of Enforceability

In Stewart v. Basey, 78 the Texas Supreme Court, noting that
"[v]olumes have been written" on the subject, announced the following test to determine whether a liquidated damages clause is enforceable or void as a penalty:
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect
the damages recoverable for the breach, unless[:]
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach
is one that is incapa79
ble or very difficult of accurate estimation."
In sum, a liquidated damage provision must be a "reasonable forecast
of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach."8 ° To
meet this prong of the test, the amount stipulated must be a reasonable forecast of the damages resulting from each breach that triggers
the remedy. Different breaches will require different remedies. Simply put, the punishment must fit the crime.

b. Different Breaches Require Different Liquidated Damage Clauses
Many leases contain, and many landlords think they want, the right
to terminate the lease and to recover accelerated rents as liquidated
damages in the event of any default. The cases, however, suggest a
more discriminating approach. In Stewart, the supreme court held
that the landlord could not enforce the tenant's purported obligation
to pay liquidated damages equal to $150 per month times the number
of months remaining after termination of a lease with a monthly rental
of $325. The supreme court reasoned that the clause was a penalty
because the payment could be triggered by the tenant's breach of any
76. Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1952).
77. Id.

78. 245 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1952).
79. Id. at 486 (quoting RESTATEMENT

OF CONTRAcrs

§ 339).

80. Id.
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covenant in the lease, and the tenant's obligation to make the payment did not depend upon termination of lease."1 The right to liquidated damages should not be triggered by any breach, without regard
to its importance or materiality or the foreseeable damages resulting
from the particular breach. It ordinarily would not be reasonable, for
example, to forecast the same amount of damages for breach of the
covenant to pay rent as for breach of a covenant not to open another
store within a specified radius of the premises.
Liquidated Damage Clauses for Breach of Covenant to Pay Rent
To avoid being construed a penalty, a liquidated damage clause for
breach of the covenant to pay rent should use the damage measure
traditionally recognized as reasonable compensation for a tenant's anticipatory breach of a commercial real property lease-the difference
between the present value of the rentals contracted for in the lease
and the reasonable cash market value of the lease for its unexpired
term.8 2 The problem with this common law measure of damages,
from a landlord's perspective, is that some of the variables (e.g., the
discount rate and the reasonable cash market value of the lease for
the unexpired term) are usually disputed fact issues.
The presence of disputed fact issues means that the tenant will almost always be able to defeat a landlord's summary judgment on the
amount of damages, which is every tenant's first objective in this type
of landlord-tenant litigation. Defeating summary judgment means a
trial. A trial means legal fees, expert-witness fees, and delay. And
delay begets more legal fees. To minimize these delays and expenses,
consider stipulating a discount factor based on a readily ascertainable
interest rate (e.g.,Wall Street Journal Prime) and a formula or other
method, such as arbitration, to determine the reasonable cash value of
the lease for the remainder of the term. While this will not ensure
victory at a summary judgment hearing, it may, at least, tilt the balance in the landlord's favor during any settlement negotiations before
that hearing.
c.

d. Common Defects in Acceleration Clauses
At common law, a tenant did not have an obligation to pay
unearned periodic rent that otherwise would accrue after the lease
was terminated, unless the lease so provided. 3 The typical acceleration clause attempts to contract around this common law limitation on
a landlord's right to recover unaccrued rentals. Acceleration clauses
in commercial leases commonly purport to allow the landlord, upon
81. See id. at 486-87.
82. See White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no
writ).
83. See American Lease Plan v. Ben-Kro Corp., 508 S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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any default, to (i) accelerate unaccrued rents upon the tenant's default; (ii) evict the tenant; and (iii) relet.84 Such a clause is unenforceable because it could allow the landlord more than one recovery

(accelerated rentals from the original tenant and rent from a substitute tenant) for a single loss. This would clearly violate the principle
of just compensation.85 Also, such a clause probably is void under the
new mitigation statute.86
4. Where, Oh Where, Has My Big Tenant Gone?
Abandoning or vacating the premises is an event of default under
most commercial leases. The cases recognize that "the ordinary

meanings of 'abandon' and 'vacate' are different," and, accordingly,
the cases hold that the proof to establish a tenant abandoned, as opposed to merely vacated, the premises is different.87
a.

Vacate

"'[V]acate'... means simply 'to make vacant,' and 'vacant,' in turn,
means 'being without,content or occupant.'"88 Vacate "does not re-

quire an intent to forsake. '89 If either the tenant or a substantial
amount of property remain in the premises, the premises are not "vacant," which, in turn, means the landlord should not exercise any remedy that is contingent on the tenant vacating the premises.
b. Abandon
"'[A]bandon' includes an element of intent ...

completely absent

from the meaning of 'vacate'. [T]he principal meaning of 'abandon' is
to cease to assert or exercise an interest, right, or title to esp[ecially]
84. See, e.g., Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Selz, 313 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ dism'd).
85. See id. (holding, in suit by landlord against defaulting tenant for all rents
scheduled for payment after date of surrender, that provision requiring tenant to pay
future rents in event of surrender was unenforceable as "mere penalty" when landlord relet premises for almost twice original tenant's monthly rent); cf American
Lease Plan, 508 S.W.2d at 941-43 (stating, in a case involving personal property lease,
that tenant was relieved of obligation to pay future rent, even though lease provided
landlord had right to "sue for and recover all rents and other amounts then due or
thereafter accruing under the lease[,]" when landlord took possession of leased equipment because landlord would have double recovery in form of unaccrued rents, proceeds from reletting, and possession of property).
86. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, §§ 8, 16 (to be codified at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(b)).
87. PRC Kentron, Inc. v. First City Ctr. Assocs., II, 762 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
88. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Shepherd, 137 S.W.2d 996
(Tex. 1940) (stating, in an insurance coverage case, that "vacant" means deprived of
contents or empty); Germania v. Anderson, 463 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1971, no writ); Knoff v. United States Fidelity, 447 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ).
89. PRC Kentron, Inc., 762 S.W.2d at 282.
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with the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it . ".'.."90 An
essential element of abandonment is the intention to abandon, and
such intention must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; while
abandonment may be shown by circumstances, the circumstances
must consist of some definite act showing an intent to abandon. Non-

use alone is insufficient to show abandonment, without being long,
continuous, and unexplained. 9 A tenant who closes its business and
moves out of the premises, but who continues to pay rent, has not
"abandoned" the premises.9 2
II.

JUDICIAL EvIcTION OF A COMMERCIAL TENANT IN FORCIBLE
DETAINER PROCEEDINGS

A.

In General

action,9 3

as distinguished from a forcible entry
A forcible detainer
and detainer action, 94 is the judicial remedy ordinarily available to a
landlord who seeks to evict a commercial tenant or subtenant from
the leased premises. "To recover in an action for forcible detainer, the
landlord must show a right to possession of the premises at the time
that the action is brought."95 Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code,
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. See City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. See Lucky v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 339 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1960, no writ).
93. Section 24.002 of the Texas Property Code gives this definition of a forcible
detainer action:
(a) A person who refuses t6 surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible detainer if the person:
(1) is a tenant or a subtenant wilfully and without force holding over after
the termination of the tenant's right of possession;
(2) is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the time of
foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant's lease; or
(3) is a tenant of a person who acquired possession by forcible entry.
(b) The demand for possession must be made in writing by a person entitled
to possession of the property and must comply with the requirements for
notice to vacate under Section 24.005.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
94. Section 24.001 of the Texas Property Code defines a forcible entry and detainer action as follows:
(a) A person commits a forcible entry and detainer if the person enters the
real property of another without legal authority or by force and refuses to
surrender possession on demand.
(b) For the purposes of this chapter, a forcible entry is:
(1) an entry without the consent of the person in actual possession of the
property;
(2) an entry without the consent of a tenant at will or by sufferance; or
(3) an entry without the consent of a person who acquired possession by
forcible entry.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.001 (Vernon Supp. 1997).

95. See Struve v. Park Place Apts., 923 S.W.2d 50, 51-52.(Tex. App.-Tyler 1995,
writ denied).
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and Rules 738 through 755 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, for
the most part, establish the rules for making this showing in forcible
detainer proceedings.
B.

Notice to Vacate

The first step in a successful eviction is giving the tenant proper
notice to vacate, validating that old Greek maxim, "well begun is half
done."96 Proper notice to vacate is an essential element of a landford's case-in-chief in a forcible detainer action. 97 To give proper notice, a landlord must send the person in possession of the premises
notice to vacate in accordance with the requirements of the lease, section 24.005 of the Texas Property Code, and any other applicable
laws. 98 A landlord's failure to comply with this combination of contractual and legal rules which govern the timing, manner of delivery,
and content of the required notices, may delay entry or cause the denial of the sought after judgment for possession.
1. Minimum Time Requirements for Notice to Vacate
As a general rule, a landlord must give the person in possession of
the premises under an oral or written lease at least three days written
notice to vacate the premises before filing a forcible detainer suit, unless (i) the parties have contracted for a shorter or longer notice period in a written lease or agreement; or (ii) the lease or other
applicable law requires an opportunity to respond. 99 This means that
the terms of many commercial leases will control the minimum notice
period. Because a landlord must have the right to possession at least
by the time a forcible detainer suit is filed,1"' and possibly at the time
the notice to vacate is given, any grace or notice-and-opportunity-tocure provisions in a lease must be examined, along with the default
and remedies provisions, to determine precisely when the combina96. Literally, "&pxri &
everything."

i ptou navT6q,"

translates "(the) beginning (is) half of

97. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (Vernon Supp. 1997).

98. Id. § 24.005(a), (e). Cf Barajas v. Housing Auth., 882 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (discussing whether additional notice was required by lease or Federal regulations); Caro v. Housing Auth., 794 S.W.2d 901, 90304 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (discussing common law demand requirement and waiver thereof in forcible detainer actions).
99. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a), (b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1997). See also
Barajas, 882 S.W.2d at 855 (discussing whether additional notice was required by
lease or Federal regulations); Caro, 794 S.W.2d at 903-04 (discussing common law
demand requirement and waiver thereof in the context of forcible detainer actions);
Blackmon v. Elliott, 1997 WL 57693, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997) (unpublished)
("A demand for possession need not include magic phrases like 'notice to vacate' or
'demand for possession' ....").
100. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (stating that tenant commits forcible detainer if tenant refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand and holds over after the termination of tenant's right of possession).
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tion of the tenant's conduct, any act or notice by the landlord, and the
passage of time will ripen into the landlord's right to take possession.

A landlord who files a forcible detainer suit on grounds that the tenant is holding over beyond the end of the rental term or renewal period also may be required to comply with the tenancy termination

requirements of section 91.001 of the Texas Property Code.101
2.

Manner of Giving Notice to Vacate

In addition to any requirements in the lease directing the manner of
giving notice, section 24.005 of the Texas Property Code requires a
landlord to give the statutory notice to vacate in person or by mail at
the premises in question. 10 2 Notice in person may be by personal delivery to the tenant or to any person residing at the premises who is
sixteen years of age or older or by personal delivery to the premises
and affixing the notice to the inside of the main entry door.'0 3 Notice

by mail may be by regular mail or by registered or certified mail, re101. Section 91.001. Notice for Terminating Certain Tenancies.
(a) A monthly tenancy or a tenancy from month to month may be terminated by the tenant or the landlord giving notice of termination to the other.
(b) If a notice of termination is given under Subsection (a) and if the rentpaying period is at least one month, the tenancy terminates on whichever of
the following days is the later:
(1) the day given in the notice for termination; or
(2) one month after the day on which the notice is given.
(c) If a notice of termination is given under Subsection (a) and if the rentpaying period is less than a month, the tenancy terminates on whichever of
the following days is the later:
(1) the day given in the notice for termination; or
(2) the day following the expiration of the period beginning on the day on
which notice is given and extending for a number of days equal to the
number of days in the rent-paying period.
(d) If a tenancy terminates on a day that does not correspond to the beginning or end of a rent-paying period, the tenant is liable for rent only up to
the date of termination.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) do not apply if:
(1) a landlord and a tenant have agreed in an instrument signed by both
parties on a different period of notice to terminate the tenancy or that no
notice is required; or
(2) there is a breach of contract recognized by law.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.001 (Vernon 1995).
102. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 2 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(f)) ("The notice to vacate shall be given in person or by
mail at the premises in question. Notice in person may be by personal delivery to the
tenant or any person residing at the premises who is 16 years of age or older or personal delivery to the premises and affixing the notice to the inside of the main entry
door. Notice by mail may be by regular mail. [oe] by registered mail, or by certified
mail, return receipt requested, to the premises in question. If the dwelling has no
mailbox and has a keyless bolting device, alarm system. or dangerous animal that
prevents the landlord from entering the premises to leave the notice to vacate on the
inside of the main entry door. the landlord may securely affix the notice on the
outside of the main entry door.").
103. See id.
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turn receipt requested, to the premises in question. 10 4 The statutory
notice period is calculated from the day on which the notice is delivered. 10 5 When a lease establishes different notice requirements, the
landlord should comply with both the statute and the notice provisions in the lease.
3. Content of Notice to Vacate
"A demand for possession need not include magic phrases like 'notice to vacate' or 'demand for possession' ...."106 But it should state
clearly whether the landlord intends to terminate the lease or only the
tenant's right to possession.
4. Traps for the Unwary
Especially in cases in which a landlord desires to preserve its claims
for unaccrued rent or damages, it should avoid the many traps for the
unwary involved in sending notice to vacate. Some of these traps are
discussed below.
a. Properly Wording Demands and Notices
A landlord should ensure that it does not inadvertently terminate
the lease by carelessly wording a demand letter. Most leases, and
many cases, recognize a distinction between terminating the lease
(which usually terminates the landlord's right to unaccrued rent) and
merely terminating the tenant's right to possession (which, in principle, does not terminate the landlord's right to unaccrued rent or damages). 107 This small distinction usually makes a large difference in
whether a landlord can successfully pursue its monetary claims against
a tenant and the cost of doing so.
Two cases are illustrative. In Cavalcade Oil Corp. v. Samuel,a°8 the
trial court ruled that a demand letter, which stated "The undersigned
elects to and does declare a forfeiture of the agreement if said due and
payable amounts are not paid within three days[,]" was ambiguous. 0 9
This ambiguity created a fact issue for submission to the jury on
whether the landlord intended to terminate the lease, which would
have caused the landlord to forfeit its right to recover unaccrued rent
104. See id.
105. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
106. Blackmon v. Elliott, 1997 WL 57693, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997)
(unpublished).
107. Compare Cavalcade Oil Corp. v. Samuel, 746 S.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Tex. App.El Paso 1988, writ denied) (holding that reference to termination of lease in demand
letter did not result in forfeiture of landlord's right to recover future rent) with Rohrt
v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 349 S.W.2d 95, 96-98 (Tex. 1961) (holding that landlord could not
recover future rent because landlord sent letter to tenant announcing landlord's intention to "declare the lease forfeited" if tenant did not pay past due rent).
108. 746 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied).
109. See id. at 844.
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or damages for the tenant's breach of the lease, or only to terminate
the tenant's right to possession, which would allow the landlord to
preserve its right to recover unaccrued rent or damages. 110 Although
the jury found that the landlord did not forfeit the lease, and thus
retained the right to recover rents for the remainder of the lease term,
the landlord had to endure the expense and risks of a jury trial because of the unfortunate wording of its demand letter. In Rohrt v.
Kelly Manufacturing Co.,"' the landlord was less fortunate, forfeiting

breach
its right to recover unaccrued rents or damages for the1tenant's
2
letter.
demand
its
in
forfeiture
mentioned
it
because
b. Don't Overlook Making Common Law Demand for Payment

Texas law is arguably still unsettled on the issue of whether a landlord must demand performance before demanding that a delinquent
tenant vacate the premises. At common law, a landlord could not terminate a written lease for the tenant's breach, or exercise any right of
reentry, unless the landlord first demanded performance. 13 Because
this demand is a vestigial element of the common law action for ejectment, a demand for performance would seem to have no place in a
statutory action for forcible detainer. 114
Several authorities seem to support this view. In Santos v. City of
Eagle Pass,1 5 the court of appeals refused to require the landlord to
make the common law demand for performance as a condition to obtaining a judgment for possession in a forcible detainer action, holding
that resort to common law rules is unnecessary, at least when a lease
grants the landlord the rights to reenter the premises, to repossess
them, and to terminate the tenant's right of possession.116 In addition,
Chapter 24 does not expressly require a landlord to demand payment
before giving the statutory notice to vacate,11 7 and section 24.005(e)" 8
110. See id.
111. 349 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1961).
112. See id. at 96-98.
113. See McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ).
114. Compare McVea, 587 S.W.2d at 531 (stating that, at common law, landlord
could not terminate written lease for tenant's breach or exercise any right of reentry
unless landlord first demanded performance) with Santos v. City of Eagle Pass, 727
S.W.2d 126, 128-29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ) (stating that common law
demand for performance is unnecessary in forcible detainer action).
115. 727 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
116. See id. at 128-29.
117. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)-(e), (g)-(h) (Vernon Supp. 1997); Act
of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 2 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 24.005(f), (i)).
118. Section 24.005(e) provides:

ANN.

If the lease or applicable law requires the landlord to give a tenant an opportunity to respond to a notice of proposed eviction, a notice to vacate may not
be given until the period provided for the tenant to respond to the eviction
notice has expired.
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does not give a defaulting tenant the right to cure by performance
after receiving a notice of default. 119 Even so, the statement in Santos
that the legislature did not intend to require landlords to make the
common law demand
for payment before sending the statutory notice
120
to vacate is dicta.
Other fairly recent cases discuss the demand for performance in forcible detainer actions as if Texas law may still require this demand
before a landlord gives a tenant notice to vacate. These cases, however, have avoided directly ruling on the issue, finding instead that the
tenant had waived any right to this notice it may have had at common
law.' 21 The absence of any clear authority means that a landlord may
wish to demand kerformance, especially if its lease does not have a
strong waiver-of-notice clause, 2 2 to ensure that it has demanded possession "in the manner provided by law[.]' 1 23 Demanding payment
before demanding possession also allows a landlord to "include in the
notice to vacate required by [section 24.005] a demand that the tenant
pay the delinquent rent
or vacate the premises by the date and time
1 24
stated in the notice.'
c.

Determining When Notice is Effective: Deposit or Receipt

The statutory notice period in forcible detainer actions "is calculated from the day on which the notice is delivered."'1 25 The lease may
make notices effective at a different time. If the lease imposes any
notice requirements more onerous than the statute, the landlord
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.005(e) (Vernon Supp. 1997).

119. See Caro v. Housing Auth., 794 S.W.2d 901, 903-04 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied).
120. See Santos, 727 S.W.2d at 127-29.
121. See Caro, 794 S.W.2d at 903-04 (holding that tenant may and did waive any
common law demand requirement which would have otherwise been a precursor to
filing forcible detainer action).
122. See Gray v. Vogelsang, 236 S.W. 122, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1921, no
writ) (holding that contractual right to reenter upon default, without more, is not an
effective waiver of any common law notice or demand requirements); cf.Shumway v.
Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (Tex. 1991) (holding that waivers of
common law rights by maker of note must be specific).
123. McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979,
no writ).
124. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 2 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(i)) ("If before the notice to vacate is given as required by
this section the landlord has given a written notice or reminder to the tenant that rent
is due and unpaid. the landlord may include in the notice to vacate required by this
section a demand that the tenant pay the delinquent rent or vacate the premises by
the date and time stated in the notice.").
125. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997); cf. Brown v. SwiftEckrich, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, writ denied) (illustrating, in a case involving the exercise of a lease option, the types of issues that arise
when lease requires that all notices "shall be made in writing" but does not specify
whether notices are effective when sent or when received).
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should also comply with the additional requirements set forth in the
lease.
d. Remembering That Some Defective Notices Are Not the End of
the World

Improper notice is not always the end of the world or the beginning
of a flawed eviction. One court of appeals, in response to a tenant's
claim that a premature notice violated the tenant's due process rights,
held that the county court did not err in abating the proceedings to
allow the landlord to correct any defects in its notice of termination.' 26
Also, a mere notice to quit the premises, followed by the tenant vacating the premises, ordinarily will not constitute a constructive eviction. 127 Constructive eviction requires an additional feature such as
harassing incidents occurring
on the property that disturb the tenant's
128
peaceful possession.
C.

File it Yourself or Hire an Attorney

The cost of counsel often dictates that a landlord attempt to represent itself before the justice court in a forcible detainer action. Every
business entity (e.g., a corporation, limited partnership, or partnership) should be aware that it is permitted to represent itself in justice
court only in forcible detainer cases in which the tenant fails to pay
rent or is holding over. A non-attorney who represents a landlord in a
forcible detainer case brought on other grounds (e.g., a non-monetary
default) may be engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, 2 9 which
130
Texas.
in
is at least a misdemeanor
126. See Hinojosa v. Housing Auth., 896 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
127. See Rust v. Eastex Oil Co., 511 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974, no writ) (stating that notice to quit, without more, does not constitute constructive eviction because constructive eviction requires some substantial interference
which is injurious to tenant's beneficial use and enjoyment of premises); Edwards v.
Blissard, 440 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that notice to quit, without more, does not constitute a constructive eviction);
Stillman v. Youmans, 266 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, no writ)
(holding that landlord's public demand for rent in tenant's retail premises, which
caused tenant great embarrassment, did not constitute constructive eviction when tenant had entered into a new lease for lower rent before landlord made demand and
tenant abandoned premises).
128. See Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991,
writ denied); Fabrique, Inc. v. Corman, 796 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990), writ denied per curiam, 806 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1991) (expressly reserving question of whether mere threat of litigation by landlord interferes sufficiently with tenant's possession to give rise to cause of action for damages).
129. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-451 (1986).
130. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.123 (Vernon 1994).
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1. Do the Rules Permit a Landlord to Represent Itself in Justice
Court? Sometimes.
As a general rule, a natural person may represent himself or herself
in justice court or any other court in the State of Texas,'3 1 but a business entity (e.g., a corporation, limited partnership, or partnership)
must be represented by an attorney. 132 A limited exception to this
general rule prohibiting a business entity from representing itself applies in contested forcible detainer suits in justice court for (i) nonpayment of rent or (ii) holding over beyond the rental term. 33 In these
two types of contested cases, "the parties may represent themselves or
be represented by their authorized agents, who need not be attorneys. '134 A further exception to the general rule permits an authorobtain a default
ized agent, who is not an attorney, to request and
' 35
judgment "[i]n any eviction suit in justice court.'
a. Who is an Authorized Agent?
The Texas Attorney General has opined that "an 'authorized agent'
under section 24.009136 may only be a natural person and may not be a
corporation or other business entity.' 37 This opinion raises some interesting questions about some very common practices in the real estate industry. If, for example, a corporate landlord designates a
corporate management company as the landlord's agent for collection
of rents and enforcement of leases, may an employee (the natural person) of the management company represent the landlord as the landlord's authorized agent in the justice court? The technical answer may
be no. Any business entity finding itself in a similar situation should
make specific appointments of each natural person who will represent
it in justice court to avoid the possible violation of this rule.
131. But see Jonathan Swift, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 248 (Oxford Univ. Press 1977):
If my Neighbour hath a mind to my Cow, he hires a Lawyer to take my Cow
from me. I must then hire another to defend my Right; it being against all
the Rules of Law that a Man should be allowed to speak for himself.
132. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 81.101, 81.102 (Vernon 1988).
133. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 7 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.011) ("In evition [forcible detainer] suits in justice court for
nonpayment of rent or holding over beyond a rental term, the parties may represent
themselves or be represented by their authorized agents, who need not be attorneys.
In any evicin [forcib! detainer or fe;ible ntr.y and detainer] suit in justice court,
an authorized agent requesting or obtaining a default judgment need not be an attorney."); TEX. R. Civ. P. 747a; Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-451 (1986).
134. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 7 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.011).
135. Id.
136. Section 24.009 is now codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.011.
137. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-451 (1986).
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b. Contested Eviction for Non-Monetary Default
The right of a business entity to use a non-attorney representative
in a contested forcible detainer suit is restricted to the two instances
recited in the statute-nonpayment of rent or holding over. Thus, a
business entity that terminates a tenancy before the expiration of the
lease term for a non-monetary default must retain an attorney to try
the case in justice court.
2.

Do the Rules Permit A Landlord to Represent Itself in an
Appeal of a Forcible Detainer Case From Justice Court?
Of Course Not.
Although a natural person may represent himself or herself in
county court or before an appellate court, a business entity must retain counsel to represent it in any appeal to county court or to another
appellate court. Section 24.011 of the Texas Property Code does not
permit non-attorney representation of a business entity in any appeal
from justice court.138
D. Filing in the Proper Court
Once a landlord has given all of the required notices, it may file a
forcible detainer action in justice court. A forcible detainer complaint
must be filed in the justice court in the precinct in which the real property is located. 139 The venue statute applicable in forcible detainer
cases also provides that the complaint "shall be filed" in the precinct
in which all or a part of the property is located. 4 ' If a party to a
forcible detainer suit requests a change of venue, the justice court
must grant that party's request, unless'the requesting party's affidavits
fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 528 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. 14 '
E. Effecting ProperService
Pleading the defendant's name and address in accordance with Rule
742a can save time in effecting service in a forcible detainer action,
138. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 7 (to be codified at
PROP. CODE ANN.

TEX.

§ 24.011).

139. See id. § 1 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004) ("A justice
court in the precinct in which the real property is located has jurisdiction in evition
suits. Eviction suits include forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer suits.");
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (granting justice courts
original jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer cases). See also Goggins v. Leo, 849
S.W.2d 373, 375-76 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating sworn
complaint, which was not contradicted at trial, established location of property within
precinct for jurisdictional purposes).
140. TEX. CIv.

PRAC.

& REM. CODE

ANN.

§ 15.084 (Vernon 1986).

141. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 528; Crowder v. Franks, 870 S.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating Rule 528 is the exclusive rule governing change of venue in civil cases in justice court).
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especially if the defendant attempts to avoid personal service.14 2 Rule
742a allows the constable to employ alternative service if the sworn
complaint (i) lists all home and work addresses of the defendant which
are known to the person filing the sworn complaint; and (ii) states that
such person knows of no other home or work addresses of the defendant in the county where the premises are located. 143 "It shall not be
necessary for the aggrieved party or his authorized agent to make144
request for or motion for alternative service pursuant to this rule.
Strict compliance with Rule 742a, however, is required. In Winrock
Houston Associates, Ltd. v. Bergstrom,145 the court of appeals held
that substituted service under Rule 742a was ineffective because the
officer's sworn request for substituted service did not state he attempted service at the tenant's office address and the tenant's home
address. 4 6 A party should carefully review the citation and the sheriff's or constable's return to ensure that they are accurate and complete. Even though the court's clerks prepare the citations, and a
sheriff or constable completes the return, the party attempting to rely
on them bears the burden of any mistakes.
F. Pleading and.Proving the Right to Possession: The Elements of
a Forcible DetainerAction
A party must plead and prove the essential elements of a forcible
detainer action to obtain a judgment for possession. The complaint
shall (i) describe the lands, tenements or premises, the possession of
which is claimed, with sufficient certainty to identify them; (ii) state
the facts which entitle the complainant to possession and authorize
the action under sections 24.001-24.004 of the Texas Property Code;
and (iii) be sworn to or'verified.1 47 If the case is contested, the party
seeking the judgment for possession must offer competent proof, by
live testimony, of each essential element of its claim. To ensure the
availability of witnesses, the justice has the authority to issue subpoenas for witnesses,
to enforce their attendance, and to punish them for
148
contempt.
1. Sufficiency of Description of Land in Complaint
Although the better practice is to include a legal description of the
property in the complaint, it is not required. Rule 741 only requires
that "[t]he complaint shall describe the lands, tenements or premises,
the possession of which is claimed, with sufficient certainty to identify
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See TEX. R. Civ. P. 742.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 742a.
Id.
879 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
Winrock Houston Assocs., Ltd., 879 S.W.2d at 151.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 739, 741.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 743.
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the same[.]""'4 9 In Stewart v. Breese,150 the court of appeals found that
a street address could satisfy Rule 741, holding that "Rt. 1, Box 496,
Old Seagoville Road, Seagoville, Texas" described the property with
"sufficient certainty" to support a judgment. 151 Moreover, even if the
initial complaint does not describe the property with sufficient certainty, the complainant may amend its pleadings to supply an adequate description because "[a]n insufficient description in the
complaint in forcible entry and detainer is not such a defect as to deprive the court of jurisdiction.' 1 52 Thus, a county court, as well as a
justice court, should allow a complainant in a forcible detainer action
to amend its pleadings rather than153dismiss the complaint because of an
inadequate property description.
2. Facts Entitling Complainant to Possession
A party who seeks a judgment for possession must also plead and
prove the facts that entitle the complainant to possession and authorize the action under sections 24.001-24.004 of the Texas Property
Code. 5 a
a. Landlord-Tenant Relationship

Texas courts have long held that "[a] forcible detainer action is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant relationship.' 55 A landlordtenant relationship may exist under an oral or written lease,156 under a
purchase contract, 57 under a contract for deed, 58 or under a deed of
is
trust. 1 59 The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, however,
60
not an essential element of a forcible entry and detainer action.'
149. TEX. R. Civ. P. 741.
150. 367 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ dism'd).
151. Id. at 73.
152. Family Inv. Co., v. Paley, 356 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962,
writ dism'd) (citing Granberry v. Storey, 127 S.W. 1122 (Tex. Civ. App.-1910, no
writ)).
153. See Paley, 356 S.W.2d at 355-56.
154. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 741.
155. See Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Dent v. Pines, 394 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1965, no writ)).
156. See id. at 195-96.
157. See id. at 197.
158. See Martinez v. Daccarett, 865 S.W.2d 161, 163-64 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi

1993, no writ).
159. See Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. See American Spiritualist Ass'n v. Ravkind, 313 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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b. Compliance with Section 24.005
A party seeking possession in a forcible detainer action must plead
and prove that it made demand for possession in compliance with the
requirements of section 24.005 of the Texas Property Code. 16 1 At
trial, a landlord must put on live testimony to prove that it satisfied
these notice requirements. If the demand for possession is served at
the premises, the landlord should ensure that the person who served
the notices is available to testify at trial. If the demand is served by
certified mail, notice can be established by introducing a copy of the
letter and the original green card.
c. Holdover After Termination of Right to Possession
"A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on
demand commits a forcible detainer if the person ...is a tenant or a

subtenant wilfully and without force holding over after the termination of the tenant's right of possession ....

In most cases, this

section will govern the required pleading and proof in cases instituted
by a commercial landlord against a tenant or subtenant when (i) the
tenant defaults
or (ii) the tenant holds over after the expiration of the
163
lease term.

(1) Termination of Tenant's Right to Possession After Default
In many commercial leases, termination of the right to possession
upon the tenant's default is not automatic but is instead one of several
options available to the landlord. Section 24.002(a)(1) of the Texas
Property Code appears to require that a commercial landlord plead
and prove that it has taken all of the steps necessary under the lease to
terminate the tenant's right to possession. This means, as a general
rule, that a landlord, when possible, should follow both statutory and
common law by pleading and proving that (i) the default or other
event which gave rise to the landlord's right to terminate the tenant's
right to possession occurred; (ii) the landlord gave any notices or
made any demands required under the lease, under any applicable
statute, or at common law; and (iii) the landlord had the right to terminate the tenant's right to possession and, in fact, exercised that
right.' 64 Before the landlord institutes a forcible detainer action, how161. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
162. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
163. See Caro v. Housing Auth., 794 S.W.2d 901, 903-04 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied) (explaining that a forcible detainer action is available when tenant fails
to pay rent); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (holding that forcible detainer action is available when tenant holds over).
164. Compare McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, no writ) (holding that when landlord did not make formal demand for

payment of rent and for possession of land for breach of covenant, reentry and taking
possession of land for breach of covenant to pay rent and covenant limiting use of

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I2.2

34

Whelan: Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing with a Te

1997]

ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASES

317

ever, it should evaluate the effect that termination of the tenant's right
landlord's other remedies, including
of possession may have on the
165
the right to recover damages.
(2) Termination of Right to PossessionAfter Expiration of the
Lease Term
In the event that a tenant holds over beyond the expiration of the
lease term, the landlord still must plead and prove that (i) the lease
expired; (ii) the landlord gave any notices and made any demands required under the lease or by law; and (iii) the landlord fulfilled the
lease termination requirements of section 91.001 of the Texas Property Code and then gave the statutory three or ten-day notice to vacate. And while a landlord has no duty to accept rent from a holdover tenant, accepting a rent check after giving a hold-over tenant notice to vacate invalidates the notice. 6 6

3. Forcible Detainer Actions after Foreclosures
Real property foreclosures give rise to two distinct types of forcible
detainer cases. The first arises if the deed of trust creates a landlordtenant relationship when the mortgagor remains on the property after
a foreclosure.'67 The second arises if a tenant of the foreclosed-on
mortgagor remains in possession of the premises after a foreclosure.
Each scenario presents different problems for a purchaser-at-foreclosure seeking to retake possession of the premises.
a. Evicting a Mortgagor After Foreclosure
Because a justice court does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the
merits of title,'168 evidence of the supposed invalidity of the foreclosure sale ordinarily is irrelevant to the material issues in a forcible
realty were improper because, inter alia, lease did not contain an express waiver of
landlord's common law duty to make demand for payment) with Santos v. City of
Eagle Pass, 727 S.W.2d 126, 127-29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ) (stating
common law notice and demand are not required in statutory forcible detainer cases).
165. See Speedee Mart, Inc. v. Stovall, 664 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1983, no writ); see also Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 349 S.W.2d 95, 96-99 (Tex. 1961)
(holding that landlord's inadvertent termination of lease, instead of tenant's right of
possession, barred landlord's claim for unaccrued rent); Snyder v. Tousinau, 177
S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, no writ) (stating that landlord forfeits contract for unaccrued rent by filing forcible detainer suit).
166. See Struve v. Park Place Apts., 923 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ
denied).
167. See Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that parties to deed of trust may stipulate that, in event of foreclosure, mortgagor becomes tenant at will of mortgagee).
168. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 1988); TEX. R. Civ. P. 746
(stating that "merits of the title shall not be adjudicated" in forcible detainer action).
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detainer action. 169 In many cases, a certified copy of the substitute
trustee's deed introduced at trial in justice court should be sufficient
evidence to sustain a forcible detainer action against a mortgagor after
a foreclosure.17 °
A mortgagor, nevertheless, has the right to challenge the validity 1of
71
the trustee's deed or to litigate title to the property in district court.
Many justices and county court judges, however, are reluctant to evict
a mortgagor after a foreclosure while a suit challenging its validity is
pending in district court. This reluctance is appropriate. If a foreclosure is void, 17 2 a justice court probably does not have jurisdiction to
order an eviction because the justice court would have to determine
the merits of title to determine who is entitled to possession. 7 3 But
such a reluctance to order an eviction appears unwarranted when a
foreclosure is merely voidable, because a voidable foreclosure only
gives a mortgagor an equitable claim in the foreclosed property.
Haith v. Drake, a case involving a contract for deed, suggests that a
justice court retains jurisdiction to render and enforce a judgment for
forcible detainer when a party defends possession based on an equitable claim to title.' 7 4 In Haith, Dr. Drake asserted he was entitled to
possession under a contract for deed. That contract created a landlord-tenant relationship upon its breach, but it did not require Haith
to convey legal title to Dr. Drake until Dr. Drake had paid the entire
consideration. Since Dr. Drake had not paid the entire consideration,
he had only an equitable, but not a legal, claim to title. As a result,
Haith's introduction of evidence of title to prove the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship did not deprive the justice court of jurisdiction. The court of appeals thus concluded that the justice had jurisdiction to proceed with the eviction and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to enjoin the eviction ordered by the
justice court because Dr. Drake did have a claim to legal title.' 7 5
The rule' applied in Haith also appears consistent with the Texas
Supreme Court's ruling in McGlothlin v. Kliebert. 76 In McGlothlin,
the supreme court held that a district court could only enjoin a forci169. See Midgett v. Resolution Trust Corp., 1991 WL 42830, at *1 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (unpublished); see also Mitchell v. Armstrong
Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Home Say. Ass'n, 600 S.W.2d at 913.
170. See Midgett, 1991 WL 42830, at *1.
171. See Mitchell, 911 S.W.2d at 171; Home Say. Ass'n, 600 S.W.2d at 913.
172. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674.
173. See Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d at 194, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674.
174. Haith, 596 S.W.2d 196.
175. See id. at 197.
176. 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984). See also Landry's Seafood Inn & Oyster
Bar-Kemah, Inc. v. Wiggins, 919 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, no writ) (holding that district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying application for temporary injunction prohibiting justice court from issuing writ of
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ble detainer case if the justice court did not have jurisdiction or the
defendant did not have an adequate remedy at law.' 77 Neither of
these grounds for an injunction exists when a foreclosure is only voidable. 178 The mere fact that the justice court might have to examine
evidence of the title (i.e., the trustee's deed and deed of trust) to determine whether a voidable foreclosure created a landlord-tenant relationship does not require the justice court to exceed its jurisdiction
by inquiring into the merits of title.'7 9 Moreover, at least when the
mortgagee is the purchaser at foreclosure, the mortgagor has adequate remedies at law in district .court. A district court can restore
title and possession, or award damages, to the mortgagor if the foreclosure was wrongful.' 8 0 A district court, therefore, ordinarily should
not enjoin a post-foreclosure eviction unless the mortgagor shows that
its legal remedies will not be adequate or that the foreclosure was
void.
b.

Evicting Tenant of Mortgagor After Foreclosure

The second type of post-foreclosure eviction cases arise when a tenant of the foreclosed-on mortgagor remains in possession of the premises after the foreclosure. 8 ' A foreclosure of a deed of trust
extinguishes a lease executed after, or subordinated to, that deed of
trust.1 8 2 But a purchaser-at-foreclosure, by accepting rental payments
after a foreclosure from a tenant of the mortgagor, may ratify a lease
that otherwise would have been extinguished by the foreclosure. 8 3
possession because tenant contended that justice court failed to give effect to thirtyday notice and cure period in lease).
177. See McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 232.
178. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942) ("The question
whether the trustee's deed is void or voidable depends on its effect upon the title at
the time it was executed and delivered. If it was a mere nullity, passing no title and
conferring no rights whatsoever, it was absolutely void, but if it passed title to ... the
purchaser, subject only to the right of [the mortgagor] to have it set aside upon proof
that the sale was improperly made, then it was merely voidable."). See generally Savers Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1503 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing cases
explaining mortgagor's measure of damages for wrongful foreclosure); Diversified,
Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
179. See Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 197.
180. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990)
(stating that mortgagor may seek to invalidate defective foreclosure sale or recover
damages); Farrell v. Hunt, 714 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. 1986) (stating measure of
damages).
181. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1997) ("A person who
refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible detainer if the person... is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the
time of foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant's lease[.]").
182. See United Gen. Ins. Agency Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 740 S.W.2d 885,
886 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
183. See id. (stating that if, after foreclosure tenant offers rent, and purchaser-atforeclosure accepts it, purchaser-at-foreclosure may impliedly agree to continue
lease).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

37

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Evicting a mortgagor's tenant after a foreclosure by the mortgagee
is fraught with its own perils. In ICM Mortgage Corp. v. Jacob,1 84 the

mortgagee foreclosed its deed of trust lien and then evicted the mortgagor's tenant.185 After the jury rendered its verdict in favor of the
tenant, the trial court entered judgment against the mortgagee for
negligently obtaining a judgment for forcible detainer.' 86 Although
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, its holding
appears to acknowledge
the existence of a cause of action for negli1 87
gent eviction.
4. Sufficiency of Affidavit or Verification
The complaint in a forcible detainer case must be "sworn to." '88 If
an agent makes an affidavit under a procedural statute such as the
forcible detainer statute, which does not require the agent to swear to
his agency, the affidavit is sufficient if it reasonably appears from the
affidavit that the affiant is an agent, and this is189
especially the rule if no
attack is made on the authority of the agent.
G. Suit for Rent May Be Joined in Forcible DetainerAction
Immediate possession of the premises is the only issue properly
before the justice court in a forcible detainer action, unless an action
for rent within the jurisdictional limits of the justice court is joined
with the suit for possession. 190 Although the justice court may take
evidence and construe the lease to determine who has the right of
immediate possession,191 the justice court has no jurisdiction to decide
competing title claims.192 Rule 738 permits the landlord to recover
only rent, as such, in the justice
court, but not damages for wrongful
1 93
withholding of the premises.
184. 902 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
185. Id. at 529.
186. See id. at 528.
187. See id. at 534.
188. TEX. R. Civ. P. 739.
189. See Holloway v. Paul 0. Simms Co., 32 S.W.2d 672, 673-74 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1930, no writ).
190. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 738 (declaring that a suit for rent may be joined with
forcible detainer action); TEX. R. Civ. P. 746 (explaining that possession is the only
issue); see also Rushing v. Smith, 630 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no
writ) (citing Haginas v. Malbis Mem'l Found., 354 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. 1962)); Buttery v. Bush, 575 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984) (citing Gibson v.
Moore, 22 Tex. 611 (1858)).

192.

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.

§ 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 1988);

TEX.

R. Civ. P. 746

(stating that "merits of the title shall not be adjudicated" in forcible detainer action).
193. See Haginas v. Malbis Mem'l Found., 349 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1961), affd, 354 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1962).
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1. Monetary Jurisdiction of Justice Court Limited to $5,000
The subject matter jurisdiction of the justice court is limited to civil
cases in which the amount in controversy is not more than $5,000,
exclusive of interest.1 94 This rule, however, is easier to state than to
apply in forcible detainer cases. One complication is determining to
which monetary claims this rule applies. In a forcible detainer suit in
justice court, a landlord may only recover rent, as such, and its attorneys' fees, 195 but a landlord may not recover damages for breach of

the lease. 196 The $5,000 limit, therefore, applies to claims for rent as
such. A landlord cannot assert any claims for unaccrued rent or damages in a forcible detainer suit in justice court.
Another complication is determining when to measure a landlord's
claim for rent and attorneys' fees against the $5,000 limit. The rule
seems to be that the justice court's jurisdiction over a landlord's claims
for rent are measured at the time suit is filed in justice court. In Williams v. LeGarage De La Paix, Inc.,197 the court of appeals held that

the county court, in an appeal of a forcible detainer action, did not
have jurisdiction over the landlord's suit for rent because the landlord
filed suit in justice court after rent, in excess of the county court's
jurisdiction, had already accrued. 198 In Regal Properties v. Donovitz,' 99 the court of appeals stated that if a landlord files suit before
rent accrues in excess of the court's jurisdictional limits, the county
court acquires jurisdiction, and the subsequent accrual of each
month's rent, which constitutes a separate cause of action, does not
destroy the court's jurisdiction.2 °°
Because a judgment for rent in excess of the justice court's jurisdiction is void,2 01 a party should not attempt to plead down its claims for
rent to bring them within the jurisdictional limits of the justice
court.202 In all but the smallest cases, the limited monetary jurisdiction in justice court will prevent a landlord from joining a suit for rent
or request for attorneys' fees with a forcible detainer action.

194. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
195. See id.
196. Haginas, 354 S.W.2d at 371.
197. 562 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
198. Id. at 536.
199. 479 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. Id. at 750.
201. Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ).
202. See Dews, 413 S.W.2d at 804; Willett v. Herrin, 161 S.W. 26, 28 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1913, no writ) (stating, as general rule, amount shown in statement
of cause, rather than amount stated in prayer for relief, controls determination of
amount in controversy).
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2. Attorneys' Fees and Costs of Suit
A landlord may recover its attorney's fees in a forcible detainer action if the lease permits recovery of attorneys' fees.2 °3 If a landlord
does not have a contractual right to recover attorneys' fees, it must
send its tenant a written notice demanding possession and notifying
the tenant that, if the tenant does not vacate the premises before the
eleventh day after the date of receipt of the notice, and if the landlord
files suit, the landlord may recover attorneys' fees. 20 4 The demand
must be sent by registered or by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least ten days before the date the suit is filed.20 5
The statutory right to recover attorneys' fees has two negative aspects. First, the statute requires a landlord to give ten days, as opposed to three days, notice before filing suit; second, it allows a
tenant, if it prevails, to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the
landlord. 2 6 Also, a prevailing tenant is not required to give notice in
order to recover attorneys' fees from its landlord. 0 7
3. Practice Comments
A commercial landlord should rarely join a suit for rent in justice
court. In many cases, the jurisdictional limits of the justice court will
prevent it. Even if the claim for past due rent is within the justice
court's monetary jurisdiction, pursuing a suit for past due rent in justice court may impair a landlord's right to recover damages or attorneys' fees in another court.20 8 A landlord may wish to expressly
reserve its other rights in its sworn complaint for possession with a
clause similar to this: "Landlord reserves the right to seek other and
further relief in a court of competent jurisdiction for rents, damages,
20 9
attorneys' fees, and other sums which have or will become due.,
203. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.006(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
204. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 3 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a)) ("Except as provided by Subsection (b), to be eligible

to recover attorney's fees in an eviction [a forcl!e entry And detainer suit or a forcible
d, ,ain, ] suit, a landlord must give a tenant who is unlawfully retaining possession of
the landlord's premises a written demand to vacate the premises. The demand must
state that if the tenant does not vacate the premises before the 11th day after the date
of receipt of the notice and if the landlord files suit, the landlord may recover attorney's fees. The demand must be sent by registered nail or 12 certified mail, return
receipt requested, at least 10 days before the date the suit is filed.").
205. See id.
206. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.006(c) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
207. See Mastermark Homebuilders, Inc. v. Offenburger Constr., Inc., 857 S.W.2d
765, 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 24.006(d) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (stating that prevailing party also is entitled to recover all costs of court).
208. See Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ) (illustrating preclusion issues raised by filing action for rent in forcible detainer

suit).
209. See Neller v. Kirschke, 922 S.W.2d 182, 185-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that res judicata barred landlord, who had pleaded
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H. Defendant Must Answer
If the defendant fails to enter an appearance upon the docket in
justice court or file an answer before the case. is called for trial, the
allegations of the complaint may be taken as admitted and judgment
by default entered accordingly.21 ° If the justice court enters a default
judgment, "[t]he court shall notify a tenant in writing of a default
judgment for possession by sending a copy of the judgment to the
class mail not later than 48 hours after the entry of
premises by first
211
the judgment."
I.

Tenant May Raise Defenses

A person in possession of the premises may, in certain limited instances, raise defenses to a forcible detainer suit in the justice court.2 12
But at least one case supports the position that the tenant may not file
in the justice court counterclaims in response to a forcible detainer
suit because possession is the only issue to be tried.21 3
J. Complainant May Have Possession; Possession Bond
The landlord may advance by several days the issuance of a writ of
possession by filing a possession bond.
1. Filing Possession Bond
"The party aggrieved may, at the time of filing his complaint, or
thereafter prior to final judgment in the justice court, execute and file
a possession bond to be approved by the justice[,] ... and conditioned
all such costs and damages as shall
that the plaintiff will pay defendant
214
be adjudged against plaintiff.
Setting Amount of Possession Bond
The justice may fix the amount of the bond in such amount as the
probable amount of costs of suit and damages that may result to defendant in the event that the suit has been improperly instituted.21 5
At common law, "the proper measure of damages for wrongful evic2.

for attorneys' fees in justice court, from recovering them in second suit, even though
attorneys' fees incurred in justice court exceeded justice court's $5,000 maximum jurisdictional limits).
210. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 743.
211. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(c)).
212. See Grayson v. Rodermund, 135 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1939, no writ).
213. See John E. Morrison Co. v. Harrell, 148 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1912, no writ) (stating that defendant in forcible detainer proceeding could not

counterclaim for value of services in excess of justice court's jurisdiction to offset
plaintiff's suit for rent).
214. TEX. R. Civ. P. 740.
215. Id.
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tion is the difference between the market rental value of the leasehold
21 6
for the unexpired term of the lease and the stipulated rentals.
"Further, recovery may be had for special damages incurred, such as
expenses of removal and net profits, after deduction of the value of
the rental differences. 21 7 These measures of damages should not only
guide the justice in setting the amount of the bond but should also
guide the landlord in assessing potential liabilities if the eviction is
wrongful.
3. Service and Contents of Bond
The defendant shall be notified by the justice court that the plaintiff
has filed a possession bond. 1 8 Such notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of citation and shall inform the defendant of all of
the following rules and procedures:
a.

Counterbond: Defendant May Remain in Possession

Defendant may remain in possession if defendant executes and files
a counterbond prior to the expiration of six days from the date defendant is served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's bond. Said
counterbond shall be approved by the justice and shall be in such
amount as the justice may fix as the probable amount of costs of suit
and damages which may result to plaintiff in2 the
9 event possession
has been improperly withheld by defendant[.]j
b. Defendant May Demand Trial Within Six Days
"Defendant is entitled to demand and he shall be granted a trial to
be held prior to the expiration of six days from the date defendant
is
' 22 0
served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's possession bond[.]
c.

Writ of Possession May Issue Before Trial

If defendant does not file a counterbond and if defendant does not
demand that trial be held prior to the expiration of said six-day period, the constable of the precinct or the sheriff of the county where
the property is situated, shall place the plaintiff in possession of the
property promptly after the expiration of six days from the date defendant22is
served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's possession
1
bond[.]

216. Design Ctr. Venture v. Overseas Multi-Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d 469, 473
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Briargrove Shopping Ctr.
Joint Venture v. Vilar, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 329, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no writ)).
217. Id. at 473; see Birge v. Toppers Menswear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79, 84-85 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218.
219.
220.
221.

TEX.
TEX.
TEX.
TEX.

R.
R.
R.
R.

Civ.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.

P.
P.
P.
P.

740.
740(a).
740(b).
740(c).
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d. Writ of Possession.May Issue After Trial
If, in lieu of a counterbond, defendant demands trial within said sixday period, and if the justice of the peace rules after trial that plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or sheriff
shall place the plaintiff in possession of the property five days after
such determination by the justice of the peace.

Trial in the Justice Court

K.

Although trial in the justice court is often conducted informally, a
landlord must be prepared to introduce testimony, based on the personal knowledge of each witness, to prove each element of its forcible
detainer claim. A landlord should bring the original of the lease and
any other exhibits (e.g., payment ledgers, demand letters, green cards)
it intends to introduce at the trial;22 3 show them to the court and the
opposition; lay the evidentiary foundation for admission; 22 4 and offer
true and correct copies as exhibits at the trial. 2 5
1. Time From Service Until Trial: Six to Ten Days
Trial in justice court shall be held not more than ten days nor less
than six days from the date of service of the citation on the defendant. 2 6 But, "[f]or good cause shown, supported by affidavit of either
party, the trial may be postponed not exceeding six days. '' 227 Most
justice courts take the position that trial cannot be postponed more
than once or for more than six days, even if the parties agree to do so.
Right to Jury Trial
Any party shall have the right of trial by jury, by making a request
to the court on or before five days from the date the defendant is
served with citation, and by paying a jury fee of five dollars.22 8 If
neither party demands a jury, the justice shall try the case. 2 9 If either
party demands a jury, the jury shall be empaneled and sworn as in
other cases; and after hearing the evidence, it shall return its verdict in
.2.

222. TEX. R. Civ. P. 740(d).
223. See TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1.002 (declaring that to prove the content of a writing,
the original is required except as otherwise provided in the rules or by law).
224. An excellent practical guide to laying foundations for the admission of evidence, especially for the non-litigator, is Schlueter, Onion, Barrow and Imwinkelried,
TEXAS EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS (The Michie Co. 1992). It provides detailed
sample foundations for the admission of most types of documents that would be introduced in a forcible detainer case.
225. See also TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 1003 (holding that a duplicate is admissible to the
same extent as an original unless a question is raised as to its authenticity or it would
otherwise be unfair to admit the duplicate).
226. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 739.
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 745.
228. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 744.
229. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 747.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

43

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

favor of the plaintiff or the defendant as it shall find.23 ° The justice of
2 31
the peace shall not charge the jury in any cause tried before a jury.
3.

Motion for Directed Verdict

Rule 565 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure gives a justice the
right to instruct a verdict.23 2 If a forcible detainer suit is tried before a
jury, the landlord or his authorized representative should consider
moving for a directed verdict immediately after the defendant completes the presentation of its evidence. If the justice grants the motion, the case is taken away from the jury and decided by the court.
4.

Judgment in Justice Court

Rule 748 requires the justice to give judgment for possession, costs,
and damages to the prevailing party.2 3 3 It is better practice to present
a judgment to the justice for signature and entry rather than to rely on
the justice's notations on the docket sheet.2 34 A signed judgment is a
prerequisite to issuance of a writof possession 235 and to an appeal to
county court.2 36
L.

Writ of Possession

A landlord who prevails in an eviction suit is entitled to a judgment
for possession of the premises and issuance of a writ of possession.2 37
A writ of possession may not be issued before the sixth day after the
date on which the judgment for possession is rendered unless a possession bond has been filed and approved under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure and judgment for possession is thereafter granted by default.2 38 The constable must post a warning to notify the tenant that
230. See id.
231. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 554.
232. See Triple T Inns, Inc. v. Roberts, 800 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1990, writ denied).
233. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 748.
234. See id. (stating, among other things, that no writ of possession shall issue until
five days from the day the judgment is signed); Pullin v. Parrish, 306 S.W.2d 241, 242
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd) (stating record must affirmatively
show, in appeal of case tried before jury, that notation on docket sheet is a judgment

and not a verdict).
235. TEX. R. Civ. P. 748.
236. See Housing Auth. v. Sanders, 693 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
237. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(a)) ("A landlord who prevails in an eviction suit [a-f-or-i
WOe
.ntry and detAiMr or a foribl deGtAir action] is entitled to a judgment for possession of the premises and a writ of possession. In this chapter, "premises" means

the unit that is occupied or rented and any outside area or facility that the tenant is
entitled to use under a written lease or oral rental agreement, or that is held out for
the use of tenants generally."); TEX. R. Civ. P. 748.
238. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(b)) ("A writ of possession may not be issued before the
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the writ has been issued and that the tenant vacate the premises
before the writ is executed. 3 9 The writ is then executed if the tenant
does not leave voluntarily or announces its intent not to do so. An
officer, if necessary, may use reasonable force in executing the writ.2 4 °
1. Execution of Writ of Possession
The mandatory provisions in a writ of possession summarize what
happens when a sheriff or constable executes it. The writ orders the
sheriff or constable to:
(1) post a written warning of at least 8-1/2 by 11 inches on the
exterior of the front door of the rental unit notifying the tenant that
the writ has been issued and that the writ will be executed on or
after a specific date and time stated in the warning not sooner than
24 hours after the warning is posted and
(2) when the writ is executed:
(A) deliver possession of the premises to the landlord:
(l instruct the tenant and all persons claiming under the tenant
to leave the premises immediately, and, if the persons fail to comply, physically remove them;
(C [(24] instruct the tenant to remove or to allow the landlord,
the landlord's representatives, or other persons acting under the officer's supervision to remove all personal property from the rental
unit other than personal property claimed to be owned by the landlord; and
D__[(-3)] place, or have an authorized person place, the removed
personal property outside the rental unit at a nearby location, but
not blocking a public sidewalk, passageway,
or street and not while
24
it is raining, sleeting, or snowing. 1
2.

Disposition of a Tenant's Property

The constable's primary role is to keep the peace. Even though the
officer may engage the services of a bonded or insured warehouseman
to remove and store, subject to applicable law, part or all of the property at no cost to the landlord or the officer executing the writ, 4 2 the
landlord ordinarily must arrange for the movers. But the officer may
sixth day after the date on which the judgment for possession is rendered unless a
possession bond has been filed and approved under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and judgment for possession is thereafter granted by default."); TEX. R. Civ. P.
748.
239. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(d)(1)).
240. See id. § 4 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(h)) ("(Lh)A
sheriff or constable [(g)oAn officer] may [,if neessary,] use reasonable force in executing a writ under this section.").
241. Id. § 4 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.006(d)).
242. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061(e) now provides:
(e) The writ of possession shall authorize the officer, at the officer's discretion, to engage the services of a bonded or insured warehouseman to re-
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not require the landlord to store the tenant's property. 43 In some
cases, a landlord may desire to utilize a forcible detainer action to
avoid having to store a tenant's personal property.

3. Conversion
The seizure of a tenant's property under a writ of possession does
not necessarily protect a landlord from liability for conversion. "Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion and control by a person
over the property of another., 244 A writ of possession carried out in
compliance with section 24.0061 does not give rise to a claim for conversion because the assumption of control over the property is not
wrongful. 245 This rule may not completely protect a landlord from
liability if the eviction itself, and thus the writ of possession, is later
found to be wrongful.246
M.

The First Appeal: Justice Court to County Court

In almost every seriously contested forcible detainer action, the
loser in justice court appeals to county court. Trial in county court is
de novo.247 Although an appeal inevitably involves some delay and
additional expense, "[t]he trial, as well as all hearings and motions,
shall be entitled to precedence in the county court. '2 48 A forcible detainer case may be called to trial in county court "at any time after the
expiration of eight
full days after the date the transcript is filed in the
249
county court.

A party seeking an early trial in county court should keep in contact
with the clerk of the justice court to ensure that the transcript is prepared promptly and sent to the county court. Once the county court
receives the transcript, a party desiring an early trial date should immove and store, subject to applicable law, part or all of the property at no
cost to the landlord or the officer executing the writ.
Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 24.0061(e)); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0062 (Vernon Supp.
1997) (governing warehouseman's liens).
243. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 4 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.0061(f)).

244. Campos v. Investment Management Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
245. Id.
246. Cf.TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.0062 (Vernon 1997) (stating that
judgment debtor is entitled to receive fair market value of property taken under writ
of execution if judgment is overturned). See generally TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 7.03 (Vernon 1986) (stating that officer executing writ, in good faith, is not
liable for damages); Richardson v. Parker, 903 S.W.2d 801, 804-05 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1995, no writ) (stating that official acts in good faith, if a reasonably prudent official,
under the same or similar circumstances, would have acted in the same manner).
247. TEX. R. Civ. P. 751; see Poole v. Goode, 442 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
248. TEX. R. Civ. P. 751.
249. TEX. R. Civ. P. 753.
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mediately request a preferential trial setting under Rule 751. And it
rarely hurts to speak with the county court's setting clerk about obtaining an early trial setting.
1. Either Party May Appeal from Adverse Judgment
Either party may appeal a final judgment rendered by the justice
court in a forcible detainer case to the county court in the county in
which the judgment is rendered.25 0 A party may even appeal an
agreed judgment and receive a trial de novo in county court.25 '
Although an agreed judgment entered in the justice court does not
deprive the county court of jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo, a
party who enters into an agreed judgment may nevertheless waive the
right, or be estopped, to challenge the justice court's judgment in
county court.25 2
2.

Filing Appeal Bond Within Five Days is Required to Perfect
Appeal

Either party may perfect an appeal to county court by "filing with
the justice within five days after the judgment is signed, a bond to be
approved by said justice. '25 3 The phrase "[f]iling with the justice" in

Rule 749 means that documents may be filed with the clerk in justice
court or by handing them to the justice.254 If the last day to file a
bond falls on a weekend or legal holiday, then the bond must be filed

on the next day that is neither a weekend nor a legal holiday.255
Satisfying these requirements confers a significant benefit on the
loser in justice court. Perfecting an appeal to county court in a forcible detainer case vacates and annuls the judgment of the justice
court.256 Failing to timely file an appeal bond in accordance with Rule
250. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749.
251. Mullins v. Coussons, 745 S.W.2d 50, 50-51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, no writ). See generally Hall v. McKee, 179 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1944, no writ).
252. See Pair v. Buckholt, 60 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, no
writ). See also Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1984)
(holding that tort defendant could not reserve right to complain about judgment after
filing motion urging trial court to render judgment for actual damages by accompanying motion with brief in which it took back what it urged in its own motion).
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 749; Ragsdale v. Ward, 173 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1943, no writ) (holding that Rule 749 requires landlord, as well as tenant, to
post bond in order to perfect appeal, even if party appeals only portion of judgment
granting or denying recovery of rent); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 749(c) (explaining that
appeal is perfected when appeal bond or pauper's affidavit is timely filed).
254. See Pharis v. Culver, 677 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ) (citing Tisdale v. F. Hannes & Co., 278 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1925, no writ)).
255. See Estate of Zamaro v. Rodriguez, 517 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
256. See Poole v. Goode, 442 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dyches v. Ellis, 199 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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749 deprives the county court at law of jurisdiction to review the judgment rendered by the justice court, requiring dismissal of the
appeal.2 57
3.

No Motion for New Trial Permitted in Forcible Detainer Cases

"In appeals in forcible entry and detainer cases, no motion for new
trial shall be filed. '258 Thus, filing a motion for new trial in justice
court does not extend the five-day deadline to perfect an appeal to
county court.2 59
4.

Payment of Costs of Appeal

If the appellant fails to pay the costs of appeal within twenty days
after being given notification to do so by the county clerk, "the appeal

shall be deemed not perfected" and the county court may dismiss the
appeal.2 6° If, however, the county clerk does not send notice to the
appellant in accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure, the county court may not
dismiss the appeal because of the
261
appellant's failure to pay costs.
5. Effect of Perfection of Appeal to County Court
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal to the county court,
including an appeal in a forcible detainer case, vacates and annuls the
judgment of the justice court.2 62
Austin 1947, no writ) (citing Speed v. Sawyer, 88 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1935, no writ)).
257. See RCJ Liquidating Co. v. Village, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1984) (per
curiam); Wetsel v. Fort Worth Brake, Clutch & Equip., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Stegall v. Cameron, 601 S.W.2d 771, 772-73 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ dism'd) (holding that special rules for appeals in forcible
detainer cases apply even if landlord joined suit for rent in justice court).
258. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749; RCJ Liquidating Co., 670 S.W.2d at 644; Wetsel, 780
S.W.2d at 953-54.
259. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749; RCJ Liquidating Co., 670 S.W.2d at 644 (holding that
county court lost jurisdiction over appeal from justice court because appellant, who
was waiting for justice of the peace to decide motion for new trial, waited more than
five days after justice of the peace signed judgment to file appeal bond); Wetsel, 780
S.W.2d at 952.
260. TEX. R. Civ. P. 143a.
261. See DePue v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, no writ).
262. See Poole v. Goode, 442 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dyches v: Ellis, 199 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1947, no writ) (citing Speed v. Sawyer, 88 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1935, no writ)).
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Sending Notice of Filing of Appeal Bond Required
Rule 749 requires the appealing party to give notice*of the filing of
its appeal bond to the adverse party.263 "Rule 749 does not provide
'
that giving notice of the filing of an appeal bond is jurisdictional."264
6.

7. Filing Pauper's Affidavit Permitted
Rule 749a allows an appellant to perfect an appeal by filing a pauper's affidavit in lieu of an appeal or cost bond. Like an appeal bond,
however, a pauper's affidavit must be filed within five days after the
day the judgment is signed.265 In an appeal of an eviction for nonpayment of rent, the county court is not authorized to enter a default
judgment against a tenant who does not timely make the required
payments into the registry of the court.2 66

8. Amount of Appeal Bond
"The justice shall set the amount of the bond to include the items
enumerated in Rule 752. " 267 Rule 752 permits the appellant or the
appellee "to plead, prove and recover his damages, if any, suffered for
withholding or defending the premises during the pendency of the appeal[,]" including loss of rentals and reasonable attorneys' fees in the
justice and county courts. Only the party prevailing in county court
shall be entitled to recover damages and costs. 26 8 Most justice courts
set the bond for about two months rent, plus a small amount for attorneys' fees.
9. Form of Bond
The appeal bond must be payable to the adverse party, conditioned
that the appellant will prosecute his appeal with effect, or pay all costs
and damages which may be adjudged against him. 269 Rule 750 provides a sample form of an appeal bond.27 0 Although the failure to file
timely an appeal bond is a jurisdictional defect, certain defects in the
263. See TEX. R. CiY. P. 749.
264. Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 877 S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). But see Simmons v. Brannum, 182 S.W.2d 1020,
1021 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1944, no writ) (stating that failure to give notice of.
filing of appeal bond is jurisdictional defect).
265. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749a; Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apts., 776 S.W.2d 578,
579-82 (Tex. 1989).
266. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749b; Kennedy v. Highland Hills Apts., 905 S.W.2d 325,
327 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ) (holding that Rule 749b(3) is not determinative
of the merits of the issue of the right of possession). But see Ibarra v. Housing Auth.,
791 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (applying Rule 749b in
a way that was determinative of merits of issue of right of possession).
267. TEX. R. Civ. P. 749.
268. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 752.
269. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749.
270. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 750.
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form of an appeal bond timely filed may be cured by the party posting
the bond.271 A county court, sitting as an appellate court, has broad
27 2
authority to amend an appeal bond to correct any defects in form.
The test that determines whether jurisdiction has been conferred on
the appellate court does not depend on the form or substance of the
bond, certificate or affidavit, but on whether the instrument was filed
in a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction. 73
10. Liability of Sureties
The prevailing party on the appeal "shall be entitled to recover
against the sureties on the appeal bond .... ,,274 The liability of the
sureties on an appeal bond is limited to the penal sum stipulated in the
appeal bond, even though the liability of the principal on such a bond
is not.2 75 The prevailing party on appeal to the county court may recover from the principal and the sureties on the appeal bond any damages properly awarded by the county court, even if the justice court
did not award any damages.2 76
11.

Rule 752: Landlord's Damages Pending Appeal in County
Court
"On trial of the cause in the county court the appellant or appellee
shall be permitted to plead, prove, and recover his damages, if any,
suffered for withholding or defending possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal. 21 77 To recover damages under Rule
752, a landlord must plead for them and prevail in county court.278
a. Landlord's Damages Pending Appeal: JurisdictionalAmounts
Under Rule 752, the county court's jurisdiction over the landlord's
damage claims is not restricted by the $5,000 limitation on the justice
court's subject matter jurisdiction because such damages are ancillary
271. See Family Inv. Co. v. Paley, 356 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1962, writ dism'd).
272. See Pharis v. Culver, 677 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ) (stating county court's power to amend an appeal bond included power
to amend a misdemeanor bond erroneously filed as an appeal bond in forcible detainer case); see also Weeks v. Hobson, 877 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (stating justice court should have allowed appellant,
who had filed an unsworn pauper's affidavit, opportunity to file properly sworn pauper's affidavit).
273. Pharis,677 S.W.2d at 170.
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 752.
275. See Lucas v. Hayter, 376 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964,
writ dism'd).
276. See Bobbitt v. Womble, 708 S.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, no writ).
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 752.
278. See Krull v. Somoza, 879 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
writ denied).
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to the main cause of action.2 7 9 Accordingly, once the county court at
law obtains jurisdiction over the suit for possession, the subsequent
enlargement of the damages does not oust the county court of jurisdiction even though the damages asserted, had they accrued when suit
was first filed, would have been in excess of the county court's jurisdiction. "No amount is stated as a limit that may be recovered. 280
For jurisdictional purposes, it is important to distinguish between the
damages the county court may award under Rule 752, which may exceed the $5,000 jurisdictional limit of28the
justice court, and claims for
1
rent under Rule 738, which may not.
b. Measure of Landlord's Damages When Tenant Withholds
Possession of Premises PendingAppeal
Damages recoverable under Rule 752 are, as a general rule, those
damages that accrue between the time of judgment in the justice court
and the time of judgment in the county court. Actions for damages,
costs, and fees in a forcible detainer action are ancillary to the main
action for possession.282 The measure of the landlord's damages when
a tenant withholds possession of the premises pending appeal of the
forcible detainer action is the reasonable rental value of the leased
premises.283 Under Rule 752, the landlord who elects to pursue a forcible detainer action is entitled to recover the value of the use of the
premises, not as measured by the rental contract, but at a reasonable
or market rental value of the property which has been wilfully withheld from him.284 This means that the landlord, in order to recover
damages under Rule 752, must put on evidence, through a qualified
witness, to prove that the sum sought represents the reasonable rental
value of the premises.285
279. See Haginas v. Malbis Mem'l Found., 349 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Civ.'App.Houston 1961), affd, 354 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. 1962); Williams v. LeGarage De La
Paix, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
280. Haginas, 349 S.W.2d at 958.
281. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 738; Haginas, 354 S.W.2d at 371 (stating that Rule 738
limits amount of rent which may be recovered in justice court to the justice court's
jurisdictional maximum); see also Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating that appellate jurisdiction of county court
is limited to jurisdictional limits of justice court as to claims for rent joined in forcible

detainer cases).
282. See Fitch v. Wilkins Props., 635 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982,

no writ).
283. See Hart v. Keller Props., 567 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ); Stewart v. Breese, 367 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ
dism'd); Snyder v. Tousinau, 177 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944,
no writ); see also Koelzer v. Pizzirani, 718 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no writ) (applying same rule in forcible entry and detainer case).
284. See Snyder, 177 S.W.2d at 800 (holding that proof of the amount of monthly
rent stipulated in the lease, without more, is no proof of the landlord's damages).
285. See id. at 800.
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Tenant's Dismissal of Appeal Does Not Affect Landlord's Right
to Pursue Damage Claim

In Knight v. K & K Properties,Inc.,26 the landlord filed a forcible
detainer action against the tenant in the justice court. The justice
court granted the landlord judgment for possession and costs, but not
for rents.287 The tenant appealed the judgment for possession to the
county court.288 Before the landlord amended its pleadings in the
county court to assert a claim for rents, the tenant yielded possession
of the leased premises and then moved for dismissal of its appeal.289
The county court denied the tenant's motion to dismiss and granted
the landlord judgment against the tenant for past due rents and attorneys' fees. The court of appeals, reasoning that the tenant could not
take away the landlord's claim by abandoning his own, affirmed the
judgment of the county court.2 90 Thus, a tenant's dismissal of an appeal does not affect a landlord's right to recover rent or damages.291
d. Attorneys' Fees
To determine which party is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees,
the issue before the county court remains who was entitled to possession on the date possession was in dispute, which is not necessarily the
date of trial.292 Attorneys' fees are included in the damages recoverable under Rule 752.293 But the decision to award attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party is discretionary with the county court.29 4

12.

Rule 752: Tenant's Damages Pending Appeal in County Court

Under Rule 752 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the tenant,
as well as the landlord, may "plead, prove, and recover his damages, if
any, suffered for withholding or defending the premises during the
pendency of the appeal. 295 But only "[d]amage claims related to
maintaining or obtaining possession of the premises may be joined
286. 589 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
287. See id. at 860-61.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 862.

291. See also Engle v. Bordeaux Apts., 939 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1997, no writ) (holding that in determining whether landlord was entitled to
attorneys' fees, jury charge should have asked who was entitled to possession on date
possession was in dispute, not on date of trial).
292. See id. (holding that jury charge should have asked who was entitled to possession on the date possession was in dispute, not date of trial).
293. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 752; RCJ Liquidating Co. v. Village, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 643,
644 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
294. See Lee McGuire 1900 Co. v. Inventive Indus., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ dism'd).
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 752.
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with the detainer action and litigated in the county court. '2 9 6 Because
forcible detainer is cumulative of the parties' other remedies,297 the
tenant may bring claims for such damages in another suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction.298
13.

Appeal to County Court Exclusive Method of Review

In forcible entry and detainer suits and forcible detainer suits, the

only method of obtaining relief in the county court is by appeal.2 99

Review by certiorari is not available in eviction cases.3 0° A writ of
certiorari is available in cases involving review of a writ of reentry.3"'
14.

Bill of Review

In Winrock Houston Associates Ltd. v. Bergstrom30 2 the court of

appeals affirmed the county court's grant of tenant's bill of review setting aside a default judgment because defective service rendered the

judgment void.30 3

296. See Krull v. Somoza, 879 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied). See, e.g., Hanks v. Lake Towne Apts., 812 S.W.2d 625, 626-27
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (holding that tenant could not recover in
county court on appeal of forcible detainer action damages for unlawful retention of
her security deposit or for wrongful eviction in another forcible detainer action because such damages were not closely related to defending possession of the premises);
Rushing v. Smith, 630 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ) (holding
that tenant could not recover in county court on appeal of forcible detainer action
damages based on value of tenant's labor before tenant received notice to vacate
because such damages did not relate to defending possession).
297. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984).
298. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 6 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008) ("An eviction [A forcible entry and detainer guit or a
forcible detainer] suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne
profits.").
299. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 749.
300. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon 1986) (explaining
that section governing review of justice court judgments by writ of certiorari "does
not apply to a case of forcible entry and detainer."); Chang v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
814 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding that section 51.002(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly prohibits the
removal of forcible entry and detainer actions from justice court to county court or
district court by writ of certiorari); Fox v. San Antonio Sav. Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 257
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ); Crawford v. Siglar, 470 S.W.2d 915, 917
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
301. See Big State Pawn & Bargain Ctr. No. 1 v. Garton, 833 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
302. 879 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
303. Id. at 149-52 (reasoning that bill of review is available to review jurisdiction
issues properly raised in an eviction case).
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Appeals from County Court to Court of Appeals

Section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code permits only limited
rights of appeal from the judgment of the county court in a forcible
detainer action.3 °4

1. Award of Possession is Not Reviewable
A final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit may not be
appealed on the issue of possession, unless the premises in question

are being used for residential purposes only.30 5 In Academy Corp. v.
Sunwest N.O.P., Inc.,306 the court of appeals held it did not have jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence of a landlord-tenant rela-

tionship because such proof involves the issue of who has greater right
of possession.30 7

2.

Award of Damages is Reviewable

The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a county court's
judgment on issues other than possession. A court of appeals may
review a county court's judgment awarding damages, but it may review only that portion of the appeal concerning the damages
awarded. 30 8 A court of appeals, however, may review a county court's
judgment denying a tenant's counterclaim for the landlord's breach of
the lease, even though there is an apparent inconsistency between the
nonappealable portion of the judgment in favor of the landlord on the
issue of possession and the tenant's appealable claim against the land304. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 5 (to be codified at TEX.
final judgment of a county court in an eviction [a
a forible detainer] suit may not be appealed on the
issue of possession unless the premises in question are being used for residential purposes only. A judgment of a county court may not under any circumstances be stayed
pending appeal unless, within 10 days of the signing of the judgment, the appellant
files a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court. In setting the supersedeas bond the county court shall provide protection for the appellee to the same extent as in any other appeal, taking into consideration the value of rents likely to
accrue during appeal, damages which may occur as a result of the stay during appeal,
and other damages or amounts as the court may deem appropriate.").
305. See id.
306. 853 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
307. See id. at 833-34; see also Chang v. Resolution Trust Corp., 814 S.W.2d 543,
544-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (stating final judgment of
county court in forcible detainer cases is not reviewable where premises are used for
commercial purposes).
308. See Academy Corp., 853 S.W.2d at 834 (stating, in dicta, that court of appeals
may review county court's award of attorneys' fees); Woolley v. Burger, 602 S.W.2d
116, 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (stating that judgment of county
court in forcible detainer case cannot be appealed, except as to award of damages);
Family Inv. Co. v. Paley, 356 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ
dism'd).
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007) ("A
forcibi, entry and dtiner"Suit or
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lord for breach of the lease. 319 Thus, if no damages are sought in a
forcible detainer action involving a commercial tenancy, no appeal lies
from310a final judgment rendered and entered by the county court at
law.

3. Jurisdictional Issues are Reviewable
Section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code does not deprive the intermediate appellate courts of jurisdiction to review a county court's
exercise of jurisdiction in a forcible detainer suit. 311 Thus, a court of
appeals may determine whether a suit is truly for forcible detainer
(over which the justice and county courts have jurisdiction) or a suit to
which the justice courts and county courts
establish title to land 3(over
12
have no jurisdiction).
4. Mandamus is Available to Review Certain Jurisdictional Issues
In Weeks v. Hobson,3 1 3 the court of appeals ruled that the county

court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the tenant, who had
filed a defective pauper's affidavit in justice court, even though the
justice court had denied the tenant's request to cure its defective pauper's affidavit.3 14 This issue, the court of appeals reasoned, did not
require it to decide who was entitled to possession but only whether
the county court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case.
Still a party to a forcible detainer suit in a county court cannot use a
writ of mandamus to accomplish an appeal prohibited by section
24.007 of the Texas Property Code.315

5. Supersedeas Bonds on Appeals from County Court to Court of
Appeals
The losing party in the county court may post a supersedeas bond to
stay enforcement of the portion of the judgment awarding money
309. See Anarkali Enters., Inc. v. Riverside Drive Enters., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 25, 26
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
310. See Walzel v. Southern Realty Corp., 245 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1952, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
311. Housing Auth. v. Sanders, 693 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Meyer v. Young, 545 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
312. See Greer v. Coleman, 1996 WL 682210 (Tex. App.-San Antonio (Nov. 27,
1996)) (unpublished).
313. 877 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
314. Id. at 479.
315. See Mullins v. Coussons, 745 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, no writ) (citing Cavazos v. Hancock, 686 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. App.-Amarillo

1985, no writ)).
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damages.316 The amount of the supersedeas bond, however, should
not include attorneys' fees awarded in the event of an appeal.317
6. Procedural Issues
The usual procedural rules governing appeals from a county court
to the court of appeals apply in appeals of the appealable portion of
an eviction case. As in other cases, filing a request for findings of fact
after a summary judgment does not extend the appellate timetables.31 8
But filing a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law will
extend the appellate timetables following a dismissal for want of prosecution and the imposition of sanctions.31 9
0.

Forcible DetainerAction is Cumulative of Other Remedies

A forcible detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any
other remedy that a party may have in Texas' courts.3 2 ° If all matters
between the parties cannot be adjudicated in the justice court in which
the forcible entry and detainer proceedings are pending due to the
justice court's limited subject matter jurisdiction, then either party
may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction for proper
relief.32 ' And as a general rule, either the landlord or the tenant may
continue a suit for damages or other relief in district court.322 In determining whether a forcible detainer suit is advantageous in a particular case, a landlord must evaluate carefully the effect that filing such
a suit may have on its other remedies and on its exposure to liability
claims.
1. Section 24.008
"An eviction [A forcible entry and detainer suit or a forcible detainr] suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or
mesne profits.

323

2.

Effect of Forcible Detainer on Landlord's Right to Unaccrued
Rent
In the absence of a provision in the lease permitting a landlord to
reenter the premises after its tenant's default and relet for the account
316. See Hughes v. Habitat Apts., 828 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
writ denied).
317. See id.
318. See Chavez v. Housing Auth., 897 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995,
no Writ) (citing Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994)).
319. See Awde v. Dabeit, 938 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1997) (citing IKB Industries (Nigeria) v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1997)).
320. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. 1984).
321. See id.; Holcombe v. Lorino, 79 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1935).
322. See McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 233.

323. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 6 (to be codified at TEX.
§ 24.008).

PROP. CODE ANN.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I2.2

56

Whelan: Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing with a Te

1997]

ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASES

339

of the tenant, a landlord who fies a forcible detainer suit to evict a
tenant, in effect, elects to recover possession of the leased premises
and forfeits the right to any rents that would otherwise accrue after
the date of the eviction.3 24 A landlord also may forfeit the right to

recover unaccrued rent by instituting a forcible detainer suit before it
properly matures its right to reenter the premises.325 And now, even a
provision in a lease clearly providing that the landlord's reentry will

not affect the tenant's obligations for the unexpired term of the lease
probably is unenforceable, at least as to the landlord's right to recover
unaccrued rent.32 6
3.

Tenant's Other Remedies

If a landlord wrongfully dispossesses a tenant from the leased premises, whether by self-help or through judicial process, the landlord
may be liable to the tenant for any damages proximately caused by
the eviction under a number of legal theories.
a.

Damagesfor Wrongful Eviction

At common law, a tenant who has been wrongfully dispossessed of

the premises may recover damages measured by the difference between the market rental value of the leasehold for the unexpired term
of the lease and the stipulated rentals.32 7 Further, the tenant may re324. See Rohrt v. Kelley Mfg. Co., 349 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. 1961); Snyder v.
Tousinau, 177 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, no writ) (citing TEX.
R. Civ. P. 752); see also PRC Kentron v. First City Ctr. Assocs., II, 762 S.W.2d 279,
289-90 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (explaining that landlord has no right to
unpaid rent accruing after termination date); Garcia v. Olivares, 74 S.W.2d 1064 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (finding that lease terminated when
landlord requested tenant to vacate); Wutke v. Yolton, 71 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1934, writ ref'd) (holding that landlord forfeited right to unaccrued
rent when landlord reentered premises without notice or demand); Walling v. Christie
& Hobby, Inc., 54 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1932, no writ) (ruling that
lease did not grant landlord right to reenter without terminating lease).
325. Cf. McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ) (finding that landlord who took possession of tenant's personal property without giving proper notice, making demand, or foreclosing properly on its landlord's lien had no right to its tenant's personal property and was liable to its tenant for
conversion).
326. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 300; Act of June 20, 1997,
75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006). Cf.
Logan v. Green, 53 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932, no writ) (stating
that landlord's reentry did not cause forfeiture of landlord's right to unaccrued rent
because of acceleration clause in this lease); but cf.Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484,
486-88 (Tex. 1952) (holding that acceleration clause in this lease an unenforceable
penalty).
327. See Design Ctr. Venture v. Overseas Multi-Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d 469, 473
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Briargrove Shopping
Center Joint Venture v. Vilar, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 329, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, no writ)).
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cover its special damages incurred, such as expenses of removal and

net profits after deduction of the value of the rental differences.3 28
b. Right to Regain Possession

A tenant has the right to regain possession of leased premises of
which he has been wrongfully dispossessed in a forcible entry and detainer action.32 9 Moreover, if a landlord wrongfully dispossesses its
tenant of the leased premises, a court may extend the lease for the
period of time that the parties are adjudicating their rights in connection with the wrongful dispossession. 330 But a dispossessed tenant, as
a general rule, is not entitled to a temporary injunction from a district
court to regain possession.3 3 ' In Housing Authority v. Massey,3 32 however, the court of appeals upheld the county court's injunction prohibiting the landlord from executing a writ of possession nine months
after the landlord obtained a judgment for possession in justice
court.3 33

c. Attorneys' Fees

Attorneys' fees are not recoverable by the tenant in a constructive
eviction action brought in district court because constructive eviction
is a tort.33 4

d. DTPA
Disagreements over the interpretation of lease provisions, standing

alone, are not actionable under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA").33 5 But almost anything else is potentially actionable.33 6 A
tenant may assert a cause of action under the DTPA against a mover
328. See id.; Birge v. Toppers Menswear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
329. See Design Ctr. Venture, 748 S.W.2d at 473.
330. See Muller v. Leyendecker, 697 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Kothmann v. Boley, 308 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1957)).
331. See id.
332. 878 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
333. Id. at 625-27.
334. See Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied) (citing Charalambous v. Jean LaFitte Corp., 652 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). But see Huddleston, 790 S.W.2d at 52-55 (Chappa, J.,
dissenting).
335. See West Anderson Plaza v. Feyznia, 876 S.W.2d 528, 532-35 (Tex. App.Austin 1994, no writ).
336. See, e.g., Goldman v. Alkeh, 850 S.W.2d 568, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,
no writ) (holding that landlord's demand for percentage rent, which landlord knew
was not owed, breached express warranty of quiet enjoyment and violated DTPA);
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 797 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990),
affd, 836 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1992) (stating that landlord's representations that shopping center was "almost fully occupied" and would be operated as "first class center"
were actionable under DTPA); Corum Management v. Aguayo Enters., 755 S.W.2d
895 (holding that tenant was entitled to damages, that landlord could not recover rent,
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who takes possession of the tenant's property pursuant to a writ of
possession.3 37

P.

Claim and Issue Preclusion

Res judicata (claim preclusion) bars the relitigation of all issues

which, with the use of diligence, might have been tried in a prior suit
between the same parties.3 3 8 The party asserting res judicata must

prove that there is an identity of parties, issues, and subject matter.339
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars relitigation of any issue actually litigated and essential to the judgment in the prior suit, regardless of whether the second suit is based on the same cause of action.34 °
The party asserting collateral estoppel must establish that: (i) the par-

ties were adversaries in the first action; (ii) the facts the party seeks to
establish by collateral estoppel were essential to the judgment in the
first action; and (iii) the facts sought to be litigated in the second suit
were fully and fairly litigated in the first action. 341 Both doctrines are
important in the context of forcible detainer actions, especially in the
event an appeal is taken or a claim for rent is asserted, because of the
possible preclusive effect these doctrines may have on the claims
(other than the claim to immediate possession of the premises) that
the landlord and the tenant may have against each other.
1. General Rule

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code states:
A judgment or a determination of fact or law in a proceeding in a
lower trial court is not res judicata and is not a basis for estoppel by
judgment in a proceeding in a district court, except that a judgment
rendered in a lower trial court is binding on the parties thereto as to
recovery or denial of recovery.34 2
and that landlord violated DTPA by misrepresenting that tenant could sell pizza from
premises and then withdrawing permission after tenant opened restaurant).
337. See Nelson v. Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 86-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
338. See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627,628 (Tex. 1992); Bonniwell
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984); Russell v. Moeling, 526
S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. 1975).
339. See Bonniwell, 663 S.W.2d at 818.
340. See Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 628; Bonniwell, 663 S.W.2d at 818; Wilhite v. Adams,
640 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. 1982).
341. See Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
342. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.004(a) (Vernon 1997). See Reese v.
Reese, 672 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ) (stating that judgment in
forcible detainer case is not res judicata to suit for trespass to try title); McCloud v.
Knapp, 507 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (holding that because exception language in predecessor to section 31.004 only covers issues actually
litigated in lower court, tenant's claims for damages for breach of oral lease agreement were not barred by adverse forcible detainer judgement in justice court).
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A "lower trial court" includes "a justice
of the peace court, a county
3 3
court, or a statutory county court., 4
a. Justice Court

Under section 31.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, an unappealed justice court judgment should not have any
preclusive effect, except as to immediate possession and monetary
sums awarded. 34 If a landlord's pleadings pray for rent or attorneys'
fees in justice court, and the judgment does not award them, the judgment in justice court 345
may bar seeking recovery of rent or attorneys'
fees in a second suit.
b. County Court
No cases expressly answer the question whether a county court, sitting as an appellate court in a forcible detainer case, is a "lower trial
court" for purposes of section 31.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. Several older cases, however, have given preclusive
346
effect to final county court judgments in forcible detainer cases.
The more recent decisions, which rely on section 24.007 of the Texas
Property Code, generally apply collateral estoppel and estoppel by
347
judgment only to the issue of immediate possession.
2. Wrongful Eviction
A tenant deprived of possession by a non-appealable county court
judgment in an appeal of a forcible detainer action is not estopped
from seeking recovery for wrongful termination of the lease in another suit. 348 A judgment of possession in a forcible detainer suit is
not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is
wrongful or not; rather, it is a final determination only with respect to
343. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.004(c) (Vernon 1997). See Morrison v. Sports Cars & More, Inc., 1995 WL 634361 (Tex. App.-Dallas (Oct. 27, 1995),
no writ) (unpublished).
344. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.004(a) (Vernon 1997).
345. See Neller v. Kirschke, 922 S.W.2d 182, 185-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that agreed judgment for possession entered in justice court was res judicata of landlord's claim for attorneys' fees in excess of $5,000
but did not collaterally estop tenant from claiming that it had not breached lease).
346. See Glau-Moya Parapsychology Training Inst., Inc. v. Royal Life Ins. Co., 507
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ); Slay v. Fugitt, 302 S.W.2d
698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Young Women's Christian Ass'n
v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Rankin v.
Hooks, 81 S.W. 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1904, no writ), overruled in, Johnson v.
Highland Hills Drive Apts., 552 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977),
writ denied per curiam, 568 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1978).
347. See Ethan's Glen Community Ass'n v. Kearney, 667 S.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Johnson, 552 S.W.2d at 494-95 (criticizing
Glau-Moya and overruling Rankin on this issue).
348. See Anarkali Enters., Inc. v. Riverside Drive Enters., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 25, 27
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
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the right of immediate possession. The judgment of possession in a
forcible detainer suit does not determine the ultimate rights of the
parties with respect to any other issue in controversy regardless of
whether the other issue results in a change of possession of the
premises.34 9
3.

Trespass to Try Title

A judgment in the justice court for possession is not res judicata in a
trespass to try title suit between the same parties in district court.3 5 °
The district court in which a trespass to try title suit is pending, however, does not have jurisdiction to enjoin a forcible detainer proceeding in justice court or on appeal in county court.3
4.

DTPA and Other Consumer Protection Statutes

A forcible detainer suit is not res judicata of a tenant's DTPA
claims in a subsequent DTPA suit between the same parties.35 2 Nor
will it3 bar claims under the Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

35

5. Declaratory Judgment: Right to Possession under Renewal
Option
In Buttery v. Bush,35 4 the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the land-

lord's suit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act for a judgment declaring the rights of the parties to a written lease and renewal
option was not barred by a judgment against the landlord in a forcible
detainer action initiated by the landlord. Because the forcible de-

tainer action was strictly concerned with the immediate right to possession, the landlord was not precluded from also bringing355suit for
declaratory judgment on the validity of the renewal option.
349. See id. at 26-27 (citing Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d at 49596).
350. See Reese v. Reese, 672 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, no writ); McClendon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990, writ denied) (approving of Reese and applying it more generally).
351. See Gillam v. Baker, 195 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). See also McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d
231, 232-33 (Tex. 1984) (stating that for district court to enjoin forcible detainer proceeding, applicant must show justice court is without jurisdiction and applicant has no
adequate remedy at law).
352. See Wilson v. Williams, 1991 WL 114409 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ) (unpublished) (suggesting that tenant could not have brought the
DTPA action in the justice court).
353. Cf. Waterfield Mortgage Co. v. Rodriguez, 929 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, no writ) (affirming trial court judgment for actual and punitive damages against lender who refused payments tendered by borrower, foreclosed, and then
evicted borrowers in forcible detainer proceeding).
354. 575 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
355. See id.
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6. Claims for Damages Asserted in County Court
By filing a counterclaim in county court seeking damages for
wrongful termination of the lease, a tenant submits the entire controversy between the parties to the jurisdiction of the county court.35 6
The county court's judgment, therefore, may bar relitigation of these
issues in another suit at least to any recovery awarded or denied.
7. Claims for Immediate Possession Barred
A number of Texas cases have held that a justice court or a county
court judgment in a forcible detainer suit is res judicata on the issue of
immediate possession of the premises.357
8. Landlord's Suit for Fraud
In Hebisen v. Nassau Developement Co.,358 the landlord leased

space to three attorneys. (The first mistake!) After the attorneys
failed to pay rent, the landlord successfully prosecuted a forcible detainer action against them. In addition, the landlord filed suit in district court for fraud, alleging that the attorneys represented they
would make certain rental payments, including rental escalation payments, but they did not intend to do so at the time they made the
promise set forth in the contract. This case may have application in
cases in which a tenant vacates at the expiration of a free rent
period.35 9
III.

SELF-HELP EVICTIONS:

TEXAS' LOCK-OUT STATUTE AND

REENTER AND RELET CLAUSES

Chapter 93 of the Texas Property Code authorizes a landlord to
lock-out a tenant as a self-help alternative to judicial eviction. Under
section 93.002 of this chapter, "[a commercial] landlord may not intentionally prevent a tenant from entering the leased premises except by
judicial process unless the exclusion results from... changing the door
locks of a tenant who is delinquent in paying at least a part of the
rent. '3 60 Before changing the door locks, a landlord or its agent "must
place a written notice on the tenant's front door stating the address

and telephone number of the individual or company from which the
356. See Anarkali Enters., Inc., 802 S.W.2d at 27.
357. See, e.g., Buttery v. Bush, 575 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Rankin v. Hooks, 81 S.W. 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1904,
no writ); Young Womens Christian Ass'n v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Glau-Moya Parapsychological Training Inst. Inc. v.
Royal Life Ins. Co., 507 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ)).

358. 754 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
359. But cf Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that reliance on term in written contract, without more,
does not support action for fraud).
360. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002(c)(3) (Vernon 1995).
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new key may be obtained."36' 1 But a landlord is only required to prohours and then
vide a new key during the tenant's regular business
"only if the tenant pays the delinquent rent. ' 362
The terms of the lease, however, will supersede the requirements of
section 93.002 "to the extent of any conflict. '3 63 A lease that does not
expressly grant the landlord the right to reenter the premises when the
tenant is delinquent in paying rent arguably conflicts with this statutory lock-out remedy. At common law, a landlord did not, and still
does not, have the right to terminate a lease or to reenter the leased
premises because of a tenant's breach, unless the tenant commits an
anticipatory breach or the lease expressly grants these remedies to the
landlord. 364 Before relying on section 93.002, a prudent landlord
should ensure that it has the right to lock-out its tenant under the
lease. And even when self-help eviction appears to be available, a
number of practical considerations limit its usefulness.
First, the statute only expressly authorizes a landlord to lockout a
tenant who is delinquent in paying rent, although it arguably does not
a tenant for other defaults if the
prohibit a landlord from locking out3 65
lease permits the landlord to do so.
Second, a landlord cannot lock-out a tenant if doing so would
breach the peace, effectively giving the tenant a veto over a self-help
eviction.3 6 6 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey,367 for example, the landlord
entered the premises by picking the locks after the tenant failed to pay
rent. Even though the lease expressly allowed the landlord to reenter
the premises in the event of a default by the tenant, and even though
it excused the landlord from liability for damages for any act or omission of the landlord in connection with such reentry, the court of civil
appeals held the landlord's reentry was unlawful. The court of civil
appeals stated:
The provisions in a lease giving the lessor the right to re-enter upon
default of the tenant,... without notice to, or the consent of, the
tenant ... and even over his protests, are recognized as valid, provided such rights are exercised peaceably and without force or violence. Here, the plaintiff was not present; it was not shown that he
even knew the re-entry or repossession were to be attempted, or
that he had any knowledge thereof until [the landlord's] agents had
already forced their way into the building by picking the lock. Having locked the building, [the tenant] must be considered as being in
possession thereof and of the equipment situated therein. He had
361. Id. § 93.002(f).
362. Id.
363. Id. § 93.002(h).
364. See Shepherd v. Sorrells, 182 S.W.2d 1009, 1011-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1944, no writ).
365. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002(c), (h) (Vernon 1995).
366. See id.
367. 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ dism'd).
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not been informed that [the landlord] had declared the lease terminated, if in fact it had done so, or that his right of occupancy was
being challenged.... [W]e hold that entry into the building by pick368
ing the lock was not peaceable but was by force and violence ....

The real rule seems to be that if a person entitled to possession can
make peaceable entry upon the land, that person may resort to peace-

able means, short of force, as will render impracticable the further occupation of the land by the other person. What force means, in a
particular case, however, is in the eye of the beholding fact finder.3 69
Third, if a landlord violates section 93.002, its tenant is entitled to
bring suit for reentry in justice court.37 ° If the justice court reasonably
believes an unlawful lockout likely has occurred, the justice, after an
initial hearing, which may be conducted ex pare,37 1 may issue a writ of

reentry, which is enforceable by contempt, entitling the tenant to immediate possession of the premises pending a further hearing on the
tenant's sworn complaint for reentry.372 To recover possession after a
justice court issues a writ of reentry for an unlawful lockout, the landlord must either establish that the lockout was lawful in a hearing on
the tenant's sworn complaint for reentry or file a separate forcible
detainer suit in justice court.37 3 Violating the lockout statute can re-

sult in the termination of the lease and the assessment of a penalty
payable to the tenant of up to one month's rent.37 4
And finally, once a landlord has initiated a judicial eviction, it probably cannot abandon its judicial remedy and attempt a non-judicial
eviction.3 7 5
368. Id. at 265 (citation omitted). See also Embry v. Bel-Aire Corp., 508 S.W.2d
469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that one who is entitled to
possession of land, but who is not in possession, may not forcibly take possession from
another).
369. See, e.g., Design Ctr. Venture v. Overseas Multi-Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d
469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Martinez v. Ball, 721 S.W.2d 580
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ); Salpas v. State, 642 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1982, no writ); McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Houck v. Kroger Co., 555 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harris v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry. Co., 163
S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Kuhn v. Palo Duro
Corp., 151 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 161
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1942); Chrone v. Gonzales, 215 S.W. 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1919, no writ); Henderson v. Beggs, 207 S.W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1918, no writ).
370. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.003(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
371. See id. § 93.003(b).
372. See id. § 93.003(a)-(e), (i).
373. See id.
374. See id. § 93.003(e); Cox's Bakeries of N. Dakota, Inc. v. Homart Dev. Corp.,
515 S.W.2d 326, (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (stating that landlord forfeited
any right to recover rent after date of unlawful lockout).
375. Cf. Houck v. Kroger Co., 555 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that when judicial eviction had been filed, injunction was proper to stop landlord from reentering premises by force); Burnett Trailers,
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DEALING WITH A TENANT'S PERSONAL PROPERTY

A landlord has three basic options when a delinquent tenant either
will not remove its personal property from the premises or leaves its
personal property on the premises. One option is obtaining a writ of
possession and having the tenant's property moved and stored. Another option is enforcing its statutory or contractual lien rights. The
final option is treating any personal property left on the premises as
abandoned and disposing of that property in accordance with section
91.003 of the Texas Property Code. Before selecting any of these options, a prudent landlord should ensure that the manner of disposition
does not wrongfully impair the ownership or lien rights of an innocent
third party.
A.

Landlord's Statutory Lien

The Texas Property Code grants:
A person who leases or rents all or part of a building for nonresidential use ... a preference lien on the property of the tenant or
subtenant in the building for rent that is due and for rent that is to
become due during the current 12-month period succeeding the
date of the beginning of the rental agreement or an anniversary of
that date.376
This type of statutory lien has two major drawbacks. It only secures a
limited amount of rent, and the lien may be enforced only by judicial
process.
1. Maximum Amount of Statutory Lien
Section 54.021 of the Texas Property Code effectively prevents a
landlord from securing payment of more than one year's rent by dividing a multi-year lease into a series of one year contracts. 377 "[W]hen
the tenant has occupied the premises for any part of any of said series
of years the landlord has a lien for the balance of such year. "378
Inc. v. Polson, 387 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (stating that when landlord could have seized mobile home, but instead sought
writ of sequestration and then dismissed that suit, landlord was required to return
mobile home to tenant); Bishop v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 229 S.W.2d
848, 849-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no writ) (stating that one may not file suit
for writ of sequestration for sole purpose of gaining possession of property and then
dismiss suit; on the contrary, in such cases, any property must be returned, and dismissal acts as abandonment of claim).
376. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.021 (Vernon 1995).
377. FDIC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,. 743 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1988, no writ) (citing Allen v. Brunner, 75 S.W. 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no
writ)).
378. Allen, 75 S.W. at 822.
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Attachment

As a general rule, the statutory landlord's lien automatically attaches to all nonexempt personal property of a tenant or subtenant
located in the building.37 9 It does not, however, attach to the property

of others in a tenant's possession.38 °
If a tenant holds over, the statutory lien attaches to any personal
property that the tenant leaves or places on the property after the
expiration of the lease term. 381 And once the statutory lien attaches
to a tenant's property, the lien continues for one month after the day
the tenant vacates the premises.382 A landlord, therefore, retains the
right to file for a distress warrant against any personal property removed from the premises during the one month period after the tenant vacates the premises.3 83

3. Automatic Perfection
The statutory landlord's lien is perfected automatically at the inception of the lease and on each anniversary of the lease for rents due
or coming due during the upcoming year.384 Article 9 of the Texas
UCC does not apply to statutory landlord's liens, and, therefore, there
is no need to file a UCC Financing Statement to perfect one.38 5 But in
order to get the full benefit of its statutory landlord's lien, a landlord

must renew its lien by following the special filing procedures described in the statute.

4.

Renewal to Preserve Lien Priority

Section 54.022 of the Texas Property Code provides that "[tihe lien
is not enforceable for rent that is more than six months past due unless the landlord files a lien statement with the county clerk of the
379. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 54.021, 54.023 (Vernon 1995); Granville v.
Rauch, 335 S.W.2d 799, 803-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, no writ).
380. See Shwiff v. City of Dallas, 327 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Vernon Dev. Co. v. Crown Bottling Co., 90 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1936, writ dism'd). See, e.g., Needham Piano & Organ Co. v. Hollingsworth, 40 S.W. 750 (Tex. Civ. App.), affd, 40 S.W. 787 (Tex. 1897) (holding that
goods on consignment in possession of tenant are not subject to statutory landlord's
lien); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stockyards Nat'l Bank, 50 S.W.2d 425, 428
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, writ dism'd) (ruling that statutory lien did not
attach to separate property of tenant's spouse). Care should be taken to ensure that
exempt property is not seized. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.023 (Vernon 1995).
381. See Maberry v. First Nat'l Bank, 351 S.W.2d 96, 100-01 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1961, no writ); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bettes, 57 S.W.2d 263,
265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933, writ ref'd).
382. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.024 (Vernon 1995).
383. See Gollehon v. Porter, 161 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942,
writ ref'd w.o.m.).
384. See Shwiff, 327 S.W.2d at 602; Maberry, 351 S.W.2d at 100-01.
385. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(2) (Vernon 1991).
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county in which the building is located."3'86 "[I]n order to preserve its
priority against intervening creditors with respect to rentals which are
more than six months past due, the landlord must file an appropriate
affidavit with the county clerk .... 387 By filing the appropriate affidavit at six month intervals, a landlord may perfect its lien for more
than six months:
"When six months' unpaid rents have been accumulated, the land-

lord may file. That protects for that period. At the expiration of
another six months he files again, and is again protected. Such protection extends until extinguished by payment. The practical
388 result
is a lien for 'past due' rents 'for more than six months."'
The effect of a landlord's failure to comply with section 54.022 of the
Texas Property Code, however, is not clear. Some commentators have
suggested that if the landlord does not file a lien affidavit, the lien is
released as to rent more than six months past due. Although some
cases contain ambiguous statements concerning the effect of the landlord's failure to fie a lien affidavit, it appears that the failure to file a
lien affidavit only affects the perfection of the statutory lien in a priority dispute between competing lien claimants. 89 It should not render
the lien unenforceable against the tenant for any covered rent.
5. Resolution of Lien Priority Disputes
"It therefore appears that precode Texas law will be followed with
respect to the priority of a landlord's lien, as against a security interest
arising under Article 9 of the Code .... "39 If another security inter-

est is perfected before the property is placed on the premises, the perfected security interest is prior to a statutory landlord's lien.3 9 ' If, on
the other hand, the property is placed on the leased premises before
the secured creditor perfects its lien, the statutory landlord's lien has a
preference.392 A statutory landlord's lien is also superior to any unrecorded security interest, even if the security interest is older than the
landlord's lien.39 3 The statutory landlord's lien also is superior to any

386. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.022 (Vernon 1995).
387. Bank of N. Am. v. Kruger, 551 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Industrial State Bank v. Oldham, 221 S.W.2d 912,
913 (Tex. 1949)).
388. IndustrialState Bank, 221 S.W.2d at 914 (citing In re Pfaeffle, 5 F. Supp. 708,
709 (N.D. Tex. 1933)).
389. See id.; see also In re Toggery, Inc., 60 F.2d 311 (D.C. Tex. 1932), affd sub
nom., Kokernot-Nixon Properties v. Wright, 68 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1933); Lincoln Ten,
Ltd. v. White, 706 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ);
Kruger,551 S.W.2d at 66; Gunst v. Dallas Trust & Savs. Bank, 8 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1928, no writ).
390. Associates Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Solomon, 523 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1975, no writ).
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id.
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other security interest perfected during the same year, but a security
interest perfected prior to thecurrent contract year has priority over a
statutory landlord's lien.3 94 These are but some of the basic rules governing the resolution of lien priority disputes. A lien search and a
careful analysis of any competing liens should be undertaken before
the landlord attempts to exercise its statutory lien rights.
6. Judicial Enforcement Options
A statutory landlord's lien can be enforced only through judicial
proceedings. Although distraint is the remedy specifically tailored to
enforce a landlord's statutory lien, 395 a landlord, in appropriate circumstances, may be entitled to utilize the extraordinary remedies of

attachment,396 sequestration,397 or injunction.398 In Hunt v. Merchandise Mart, Inc. 3 9 9 for example, the court of appeals upheld the trial

court's issuance of an injunction prohibiting a tenant from removing
its personal property from the leased premises because no rent was
due at the time the trial court issued the injunction and, as a consequence, the landlord's legal remedy, distraint, was then unavailable.4"'
7. Distraint
Even when it is available, distraint is merely an ancillary remedy to
preserve the collateral pending disposition of the primary suit for past
due rent or to foreclose the landlord's statutory lien.4 1 And distraint
has significant limitations. Because a landlord may not be entitled to
a distress warrant unless rent is due,40 2 distraint may not be available
to a landlord when its tenant commits a non-monetary default, even
abandonment. In addition, because distraint is only an ancillary remedy, it often requires instituting two separate lawsuits.
394. See Kruger, 551 S.W.2d at 65-66.
395. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 610-20.
396. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.063 (Vernon 1997); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 592-609.
397. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 62.001-.063 (Vernon 1997); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 696-716.
398. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 65.001-.045 (Vernon 1997); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 680-693.
399. 391 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
400. Id. at 144.
401. See Jarrell v. United States Realty Corp., 270 S.W. 1079, 1081 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1925, no writ) (explaining that if no primary suit is properly filed,
distress warrant is void).
402. See Hunt, 391 S.W.2d at 144-45 (acknowledging, but disregarding, contrary
ruling in DuBose v. Battle, 34 S.W. 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ)); but see Allen v.
Bruner, 75 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no writ) (citing DuBose and stating statutes authorize issuance of distress warrant whether rent is due or not).
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a. Primary Suit
The primary suit for rent or to foreclose the landlord's lien should
be filed in a court with jurisdiction over the amount of past-due rent
secured by the statutory landlord's lien.4" 3 Unless the amount of pastdue rent is less than the maximum $5,000 jurisdictional limit of the
justice court, the primary suit and the distraint proceeding must be
brought in different courts.
b. Application for Distraint Warrant Filed with Justice of the Peace
Either at the commencement of the primary suit or at any time during its progress, the plaintiff, its agent, attorney, assign, or other legal
representative may file an application for the issuance of a distress
warrant with the justice of the peace.40 4 The application may be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of relevant
facts, but shall state that (i) the amount sued for is due for rent; (ii)
the writ is not sued out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the
defendant; and (iii) the specific facts on which the plaintiff relies to
show the grounds for issuance of the writ exist.40 5 Grounds for issuance of a writ exist "if the tenant (1) owes rent; (2) is about to abandon the building; or (3) is about to remove the tenant's property from
the building. ' 406 The application must be filed in justice court, even if
the primary suit is pending in district or county court.
c.

Bond Required

A party applying for a distress warrant must post a bond in an
amount approved by the justice, with sufficient sureties as provided by
statute.40 7 The justice shall set the bond in an amount which shall
adequately compensate the defendant for all costs and damages suffered by the defendant if the plaintiff wrongfully sues out the warrant.40 8 Either party, after notice to the opposite party, may move to
increase or decrease the amount of the bond or to question the sufficiency of the sureties in the court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter.40 9 In other words, even though the justice court initially sets
the bond, the parties must challenge the amount or sufficiency of the
bond in the court hearing the primary suit.
403. See Jarrell, 270 S.W.2d at 1081.
404. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 610; TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. § 54.025 (Vernon 1995).
405. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 610.
406. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 54.025 (Vernon 1995). But see Hunt, 391 S.W.2d

at 144-45 (stating that distraint is not available unless rent is due when distraint warrant is sought).
407. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 610-611.
408. See id.
409. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 611.
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Issuance of Distress Warrant

No warrant shall issue before final judgment except on written order of the justice of the peace after a hearing, which may be ex
parte.410 Before the warrant issues, the justice, in his order granting
the warrant, shall (i) make specific findings of fact to support the statutory grounds found to exist; (ii) specify the maximum value of the
property that may be seized; (iii) set the amount of the plaintiff's
bond; and (iv) command that the property seized be kept safe pending
further order of the court having jurisdiction. 411 Rule 612 states the
formal requirements for, and Rule 613 prescribes the manner of service and contents of, a distress warrant. 12
e.

Tenant May Replevy

A tenant may reclaim personal property seized under a distress
warrant by posting a replevy bond. 4 13 Rule 614 requires the court
having jurisdiction of the amount in controversy to approve any replevy bond. 14 The bond must be in an amount equivalent to either (i)
double the amount of the plaintiff's debt; or, at the defendant's option, (ii) the value of the property plus one year's interest.415 If the
court approves the bond, the opposing party, upon reasonable notice
(which may be less than three days), has the right to seek judicial review of the amount of the bond, the sufficiency of the sureties, and the
estimated value of the property.416 The evidence at this hearing, if
uncontroverted, may be submitted by affidavit; otherwise, the parties
must submit admissible evidence. 41 7 And the defendant, on reasonable notice, may move to substitute other property, of equal value to
the property attached, for the property seized.41 8
f.

Dissolution or Modification of Distress Warrant

A defendant whose property has been seized, or any intervening
claimant who claims an interest in such property, may by sworn written motion move to vacate, dissolve, or modify the warrant and the
order directing its issuance, for any grounds or cause, extrinsic or intrinsic.4" 9 Unless the parties agree to an extension of time, the motion, after reasonable notice (which may be less than three days), shall
be heard promptly, and the issue shall be determined no less than ten
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

TEX. R. Civ.
TEX. R. Civ.
TEX. R. Civ.
TEX. R. Civ.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
TEX. R. Civ.

P.
P.
P.
P.

610-611.
610.
612-613.
614.

P. 614a.
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days after the motion is filed.4"' At the hearing, the court may consider affidavits, but must consider other admissible evidence tendered
by any party. 421 The party who obtained the warrant has the burden
to prove the specific facts relied on in the order granting the warrant;
however, the party seeking dissolution of the warrant must prove that
the reasonable value of the property exceeds the amount necessary to
secure the debt.422
g. Damages Resulting from Wrongful Issuance of Distress Warrant
If the court determines that grounds for issuing the distress warrant
did not exist at the time it was issued, the party seeking the warrant
may be liable for any actual damages suffered by the tenant or other
claimants by reason of the seizure of the property.42 3 In addition to
claims for conversion, a landlord may be subject to DTPA claims for
wrongfully taking possession of the tenant's property.42 4
8.

Waiver

A landlord may waive its statutory lien rights by electing to rely
exclusively on its contractual lien.42 5
B.

ContractualLandlord's Liens

Article 9 of the Texas UCC governs the creation and enforcement
of contractual landlord's liens. 42 6 Because of the drawbacks of statutory landlord's liens, a contractual lien is sometimes a better-but not
foolproof-way for a landlord to obtain and enforce a security interest
in a tenant's personal property and fixtures. The following discussion
is not a comprehensive treatment of Article 9; instead, it touches on a
few basic issues commonly encountered in creating and enforcing contractual landlord's liens.
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. See id.
423. See, e.g., Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Allen Morrow Co., 15 S.W.2d 1089 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 27 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
judgm't adopted) (ruling that even though tenant was in default, landlord was liable
for conversion and that third party claiming possession of property, otherwise subject
to statutory landlord's lien, was entitled to possession of that property as against
landlord).
424. Cf Myers v. Ginsburg, 735 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
425. See United States v. Truss Tite, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
426. Bank of N. Am. v. Kruger, 551 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that Article 9 governs contractual but not
statutory landlord's liens).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

71

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

1. Creation and Attachment
A contractual lien may be created in a lease by language sufficient
to create a security interest.427 Once created, a contractual lien attaches to the tenant's personal property, fixtures, and removable trade
fixtures described in the lease or security agreement. 428 But to provide any practical security, a contractual landlord's lien must also be
perfected.
2. Perfection
To perfect a contractual security interest in its tenant's personal
property, a landlord must file a UCC Financing Statement with the
Texas Secretary of State.429 If a landlord's contractual lien also covers
fixtures or removable trade fixtures, the landlord must file an appropriate UCC Financing Statement in the county clerk's office in the

county where the leased premises are located.43 ° If a landlord fails to

perfect its contractual landlord's lien, third parties may acquire rights
in the property superior to the landlord's security interest.:
3. Self-Help Repossession
The Texas UCC permits a secured creditor to use self-help to take
possession of personal property secured by the creditor's lien, unless
the security agreement expressly prohibits the creditor from doing so
or taking the property will breach the peace. 4 31 Even if a lease grants
the landlord the right to repossess the property subject to its contractual lien, the landlord cannot hold the property indefinitely without
sale, credit, or payment of any surplus by which the value of the seized
property exceeds the amount of past due rent. 432 If a landlord fails to
sell the property within a commercially reasonable time after taking
possession,'433it may be liable in conversion for "the entire value of the
property.

4. Judicial Repossession and Enforcement
In addition to self-help repossession, a landlord may, in appropriate
cases, resort to judicial process, to enforce its contractual lien.
Although distraint is the remedy specifically tailored to enforce a
427. See TEX. Bus. &

COM. CODE ANN.

§ 9.102 (Vernon 1991).

428. See id. § 9.110.
429. See id.
430. See Kruger, 551 S.W.2d at 66.
431. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Vernon 1991); but see McVea v.
Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (holding
that express right to reenter premises upon default and grant of contractual lien did

not give landlord right to take possession of tenant's personal property and finding
landlord liable for conversion for seizing tenant's property).
432. See Myers v. Ginsburg, 735 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
433. Id.
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landlord's statutory lien,43 4 at least one court has held that it is available to enforce a contractual lien as well.435 The extraordinary remedies of attachment, 436 sequestration, 437 or injunction 438 are available
in principle, but it is often difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to
obtain these extraordinary writs until it is too late.
Resort to judicial enforcement also carries its own financial burdens
and legal risks. Seeking extraordinary judicial remedies inevitably involves expedited proceedings and the legal fees that mount invariably
and rapidly while conducting them. Then, if the court grants extraordinary relief, the landlord must post a bond before the extraordinary relief takes effect. 43 9 And once it takes effect, the landlord can
be held liable for any harm caused, if the trial court, or even an appellate court, later determines that the extraordinary relief should not
have been granted in the first place.4 4 °
5.

Foreclosure

Once a landlord repossesses the property subject to its contractual
lien, it may hold a commercially reasonable public or private sale 4or
41
resort to other alternatives available under the Texas UCC.
Whether the sale is commercially reasonable ordinarily is a question
of fact, and the burden of pleading commercial reasonableness initially falls on the secured creditor.4 42 More ominous is the rule that
the secured creditor's failure to give proper notice to a debtor precludes the secured party from recovering a deficiency.44 3 Thus, if a
434. TEX. R. CIv. P. 610-620.
435. See Keep 'Em Eating Co. v. Hulings, 165 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1942, no writ) (stating, in dicta, that distress warrant may be appropriate
means to enforce contractual landlord's lien). But see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 54.025 (Vernon 1995) (Revisor's Note) (declaring that Rules 610-620 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure "now control [perhaps exclusively] the procedural matters
related to distress warrants.").
436. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.001-.062 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 592-609.
437. See TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 62.001-.063 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 696-716.
438. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODEANN. § 65.001-.045 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 680-693.
439. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 592a, 592b (bond requirements for writ of attachment);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 698 (bond requirements for writ of sequestration); TEX. R. Civ. P. 684
(bond requirements for temporary restraining order and temporary injunction).
440. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Del Norte Golf and Country Club, Inc., 614 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that landlord was liable
for conversion of tenant's personal property because landlord, under an injunction it
obtained against tenant, denied tenant access to property).
441. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon 1991).
442. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank - Southwest, 851 S.W.2d 173, 175-76
(Tex. 1992).
443. See Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Tex. 1982);
Beach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 821 S.W.2d 241,243 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]

1991, no writ).
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landlord does not perform the foreclosure properly, the landlord's
claims for rent or damages may be reduced or even barred.
C. Section 93.002(e): Abandoned Personal Property

Section 93.002(e) of the Texas Property Code permits a landlord to
dispose of a tenant's personal property without foreclosing on it. This
section provides that "[a] landlord may remove and store any property of a tenant that remains on premises that are abandoned.""'4

In

addition to exercising any other rights, a landlord "may dispose of the
stored property if the tenant does not claim the property within 60
days after the date the property is stored.

4 45

1. Notice to Tenant Required
Before disposing of a tenant's property, "[t]he landlord shall deliver
by certified mail to the tenant at the tenant's last known address a
notice stating that the landlord may dispose of the tenant's property if
the tenant does not claim the property within 60 days after the date
the property is stored.

446

If a landlord is uncertain who owns any

property left on the premises, it would be prudent to have a lien
search performed to determine if any of the property belongs to someone other than the tenant.
2. Statutory Presumption of Abandonment
Section 93.002(e) creates a statutory presumption of abandonment
in certain circumstances. It provides that:
A tenant is presumed to have abandoned the premises if goods,
equipment, or other property, in an amount substantial enough to
indicate a probable intent to abandon the premises, is being or has
been removed from the premises and the removal is not within the
normal course of the tenant's business.4 47

This presumption should give some comfort to a landlord who wishes
to dispose of the junk a tenant leaves in the space after the tenant has
absconded with the valuable property.
3. Relationship to Article 9
But relying on section 93.002(e) may be risky when a tenant leaves
behind its valuable personal property. Under the Texas UCC, a landlord's failure to promptly dispose of a tenant's property in a commercially reasonable manner may bar the landlord's damage claims or
give rise to claims against the landlord for conversion. Section
444. TEX.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447.

PROP. CODE ANN.

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 93.002(e) (Vernon 1995).
§ 93.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1997).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I2.2

74

Whelan: Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing with a Te

1997]

ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASES

357

93.002(e) does not say how a tenant's deemed abandonment of personal property affects its rights under Article 9 of the Texas UCC.
V.

A.

TENANT DEFENSES

Surrender by Operation of Law

Surrender is:
The yielding up by the tenant of the leasehold estate to the landlord
so that the leasehold estate comes to an end by the mutual agreement of the landlord and tenant. For a surrender to occur, the landlord and tenant must have a meeting of the minds and must
mutually agree that there be a surrender of the lease.44 8
Although a tenant usually must show its landlord accepted the surrender of the premises with the intention to release the tenant from further liability under .the lease,449 some Texas courts also have applied
this doctrine on equitable grounds:
[T]here is said to be a surrender by operation of law whenever the
parties have so acted that it would be inequitable for either to assert
the continued existence of the lease. Therefore, if, upon an abandonment of the premises by the tenant in possession and a default
in the rental obligation, the landlord re-enters and relets for his own
benefit, the tenant's obligations will be considered terminated by
operation of law.45 °
Texas courts have long placed the burden on the tenant to plead and
prove express surrender or surrender in fact. 51
1. Surrender When Landlord Acts as Unfaithful Agent
Many commercial leases contain a remedy provision that allows the
landlord, after the tenant's
default, to reenter and relet the premises
"as agent of the tenant., 45 2 If a landlord reenters the premises and
purports to relet the premises as the "tenant's agent," but the landlord
448. Arrington v. Loveless, 486 S.W.2d 604, 606-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972, no writ) (holding that landlord's cooperation with tenant to locate substitute
tenant did not effect surrender); see also Evans Young Wyatt, Inc. v. Hood & Hall
Co., 517 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("For the lease to
have terminated as a matter of law upon surrender and acceptance of the premises
there must have been an agreement to such effect by the parties.").
449. See Arrington, 486 S.W.2d at 606-07.
450. Dean v. Lacey, 437 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ)
(noting that landlord physically occupied premises "without taking [unnamed] precautions to avoid a termination of the lease as to all parties").
451. See Harry Hines Med. Ctr. v. Wilson, 656 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ); Arrington, 486 S.W.2d at 606-07 (stating burden of both pleading and
of proving surrender by a preponderance of the evidence is on tenant who is attempting to avoid rent payments); Crawford v. Haywood, 392 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1965, no writ) (stating that tenant's declaration of its intent to
vacate and not to pay further rent does not terminate landlord's rights under lease).
452. See, e.g., Flack v. Sarnosa Oil Corp., 293 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1956, no writ).
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instead enters into a new lease for its own benefit, the courts have
treated the landlord's self-interested conduct as an acceptance of the
original tenant's surrender of the premises, which terminates the
lease.45 3 Texas courts have found that a landlord acted for its own
benefit, rather than its former tenant's benefit, in a number of different ways.
a.

Terms of Lease with Substitute Tenant

One court found that the landlord surrendered its lease by including
a termination option in the lease with the substitute tenant. In Flack
v. Sarnosa Oil Corp.,45 4 a divided court of civil appeals held that, by

reletting premises under new lease that allowed the landlord to terminate the new lease after ninety-days notice in the event of either the
sale or demolition of the premises, the landlord accepted the original
tenant's surrender of the premises because the ninety-day cancellation
clause was included for the landlord's benefit rather than for the benefit of the original tenant. The dissenting judge argued persuasively
that, although the landlord's exercise of the termination option might
have constituted an acceptance of surrender, the mere presence of the
cancellation clause in the new lease, standing alone, should have been
insufficient to cause a surrender.4 55
b.

Landlord's Use of Premises for Landlord's Benefit

Another court found that the landlord surrendered the lease by operating its tenant's business in the premises. In Pattersonv. McGee,4 56
a state agency ordered that the property could not be used as a nursing home unless certain repairs were made. The landlord then demanded that the tenant vacate the premises, and the tenant complied.
The landlord held itself out as operator of the nursing home. The
court of civil appeals found that this evidence supported the trial
court's7 findings of constructive eviction and surrender by operation of
45
law.

c. Landlord's Use of Premises to Expedite Reletting for Tenant's
Benefit

Yet, another court found that the landlord did not surrender its
lease by allowing nearby hospital personnel to occupy a portion of the
453. See, e.g., id. at 688 (explaining that "we must either presume that if [the land-

lord] was attempting to act as the agent of [the tenant] that it was an unfaithful agent,
acting for its self interest, or that in executing the [new lease], it was acting as principal .... If [the landlord] acted as principal in executing in the [new] lease, such action

constitutes an acceptance of [tenant's] offer to surrender the leased premises and
[landlord] cannot recover for the full term of the lease.").
454. 293 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, no writ).

455. See id. at 690 (Norvell, J., dissenting).
456. 350 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, no writ).
457. See id. at 244.
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premises while it attempted to relet them. The landlord did so in an
attempt to expedite completion of the hospital so that a substitute tenant could be found to relet the tenant's office suite. After the hospital
was completed, the landlord relet the premises. Based on these facts,
the court of appeals concluded:
We have found no Texas case which finds a surrender by operation
of law where the landlord evidences an intent to relet or sell the
premises after the tenant has left, even if such intent is communicated to the tenant. If a landlord re-enters and relets the abandoned premises for his own benefit a tenant's obligation would
cease. However, the evidence here shows that [the landlord's] conduct in allowing occupation of the premises after [the tenant's] departure was done in an attempt to mitigate the damages from nonpayment of rent. The conduct of [the landlord], in continuing to
demand rental payments after [the tenant's] departure, clearly indicates that it did not accept any offer of surrender. The burden was
on [the tenant] to plead and prove that a surrender occurred.45 8
2.

Surrender is Complete Defense

Surrender is a defense to a suit to recover rent that otherwise would
have accrued after the surrender occurred. 459 But a tenant cannot recover any rent it prepaid before a surrender by operation of law.4 6 °
B.

Landlord's Breach

A landlord's breach of any covenant, other than the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, ordinarily was not a defense to a tenant's obligation
to pay rent under traditional common law principles. As a general
rule,
'[w]here the rental contract exists by which the tenant is entitled to
occupy the leased premises for a given term, and by which the landlord is entitled to receive a fixed rent for the entire term, the tenant
cannot resist the demand for rent unless he shows evidence under
paramount title, or that for some reason, recognized b'' 6 1law as sufficient, he was entitled to and did quit the possession.
The law traditionally recognized few reasons as sufficient because the
same doctrine of independent covenants that limited a landlord's com458. Harry Hines Med. Ctr. v. Wilson, 656 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ) (reversing trial court's judgment, which had excused tenant from its
obligations under lease on ground that landlord had accepted surrender and constructively evicted tenant) (citations omitted).
459. See id.
460. See Dearborn Stove Co. v. Caples, 236 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1951) (holding that
tenant, who prepaid all rent when he executed his lease, vacated the premises before
the end of the lease term could not recover "unearned" rents because rent .is not
"apportionable").
461. Miller v. Compton, 185 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, no
writ).
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mon law remedies for a tenant's breach also circumscribed a tenant's
right to suspend its performance by withholding rent or terminating
the lease for its landlord's breach.
1. Landlord's Duty to Place Tenant in Possession
A landlord impliedly covenants in every lease to place the tenant in
possession at the commencement of the lease term. This covenant is a
dependent covenant, and, as a result, a landlord's failure to make
leased premises ready for its tenant's occupancy will excuse the tenant
from its obligation to pay rent as promised in the lease.4 62
2.

Landlord's Covenant to Repair

At common law, the traditional rule was that "[a]ny obligation of
the landlord to repair or maintain the premises would be independent
of the tenant's obligation to pay rents., 46 3 Accordingly, a landlord's
failure to repair the premises ordinarily was not a defense to a tenant's
obligation to pay rent, unless the landlord's failure rose to the level of
a constructive eviction.46 4 These common law rules have been modified somewhat by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Davidow.
3.

No Right of Offset

Even if a tenant has the right to recover damages, it cannot reduce
the amounts due the landlord under the lease by way of recoupment,
offset, or abatement, unless the tenant first obtains judgment or the
lease allows the tenant the right to offset.46 5
4.

No Implied Covenant to Retain Character of Building

46 6
In Cantile v. Vanity Fair Properties,
the tenant alleged that its

lease terminated as a matter of law because the landlord changed the
first floor of the building (where the premises were located) from a
shopping center to an office building. The court of appeals, however,
rejected the tenant's argument that there was an implied covenant in
the lease that the landlord would keep the first floor as a shopping
center.
462. See Richker v. Georgandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
463. Edwards v. Ward Assocs., Inc., 367 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
464. See Ravkind v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding the tenant could, however, sue for
damages); Ammons v. Beaudry, 337 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1960, writ ref'd) (holding that tenant could recoup any damages resulting from landlord's breach of its covenant to repair air conditioning units but that landlord's breach
did not excuse tenant, who remained in premises, from paying rent).
465. See Myers v. Ginsburg, 735 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
466. 505 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Eviction

There is in every lease of land, in the absence of a provision to the
contrary, an implied covenant in favor of the lessee that he will have
peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the premises for the term of the
lease. For there to be breach of this covenant, there must be an
eviction, actual or constructive, brought about by the acts of the
landlord or those acting for him or with his permission.46 7
1. Actual Eviction
An actual eviction occurs if a landlord or someone acting under a
claim of paramount title or with the permission of the landlord physically removes the tenant or denies the tenant access to the premises.
A landlord's actions must evidence the intent to permanently deprive
the tenant of possession. A temporary interference is usually only a
trespass.4 68
2.

Constructive Eviction

Unlike an actual eviction, constructive eviction does not necessarily
involve the physical denial of the tenant's access to the premises.
In order to constitute an eviction, it is not necessary that there be a
manual or physical expulsion from the premises. If the landlord's
conduct be such as to materially and permanently interfere with the
beneficial use of the premises and the defendant leaves as a result
thereof, then there is a constructive eviction.4 69
In Stillman v. Youmans,47 ° the court of appeals stated the essential
elements of a constructive eviction:
(a) [t]here must be present the intention on the part of the landlord
that the tenant shall no longer enjoy the premises, [and that]
intention.., can be presumed from the circumstances proven[,]
(b) [t]he act or omission complained of must be material and
permanent[,]
(c) [tihe tenant must abandon the premises within a reasonable
time after the [complained of] act or omission [, and]
(d) [tihe abandonment must be a direct consequence of the act or
omission and the abandonment must be complete.4 71
467. Richker, 323 S.W.2d at 95.

468. See Luettich v. Putnum, 287 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1956, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that third party's assertion against tenant of claim of title paramount to landlord's claim of title constituted an actual eviction, even though tenant
was not physically evicted from the premises).
469. Silberstein v. Laibovitz, 200 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no
writ) (citing Nabors v. Johnson, 51 S.W.2d 1081, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no
writ)).
470. 266 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, no writ).

471. Id. at 916.
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A constructive eviction, like an actual eviction, terminates the landlord's right to unaccrued rent, and it gives rise to a claim for wrongful
eviction.
D. Failure to Mitigate
Under the traditional common rule, a landlord had no duty to mitigate its damages by procuring a substitute tenant after the original
tenant abandoned the premises."' In the absence of a duty to mitigate, a landlord was at liberty either to (i) treat its tenant's conduct as
a breach and hold the tenant liable for damages or (ii) disregard the
breach and sue on the lease for rent accruing after the breach as the
rent came due.473 Although many anticipatory breach cases recite the
rule that a landlord has no duty to relet, these same cases apply damage measures that assume a duty to mitigate once a landlord reentered
the premises.47 4 As the district court explained in Williams:
[Elven without the contract provision [granting the landlord the
right to re-enter and relet for the account of the tenant], the landlord would have had the right to relet the property and, not having
agreed to surrender his rights under the lease contract, recover from
the former [tenant] the amount of the agreed rent for the entire
contractual period of the lease less the sum that he may realize from
the reletting, after the use of reasonable diligence to obtain a [new]
tenant.4 75
Under the rule applied in Williams and other cases like it, a landlord's recoverable damages are measured by (i) the amount the landlord received from actually mitigating its damages (the rent the
original tenant contracted to pay less any rent received from, or prom472. See Williams v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 288, 29293 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (citing Evons v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Brown v. RepublicBank First Nat'l Midland,
766 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1988) (five justices suggesting, in dicta, that Texas should abandon traditional rule that landlord does not have duty to mitigate); Marynick v. Bockelmann, 773 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds,
Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1990) (acknowledging supreme
court's dicta in Brown but refusing to adopt rule requiring mitigation until supreme
court expressly addressed issue); Metroplex Glass Ctr., Inc. v. Vantage Properties,
Inc., 646 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
473. See Stubbs v. Stuart, 469 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1971, no writ) (citing Wukasch v. Hoover, 247 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1952), affd, 254 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1953)).
474. See Brown v. RepublicBank First Nat'l Midland, 766 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1988)
(Kilgarlin, J., concurring) (stating that landlord has duty to mitigate when it exercises
contractual as opposed to common law remedies); Williams, 396 F. Supp. at 288.
475. Evons v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Stewart v. Kuskin & Rotberg, Inc., 106 S.W.2d 1074, 1075
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, no writ) (stating that when landlord reenters after
tenant abandons premises proper measure for damages is difference between the contract price for the lease term and such sums as the landlord may have received by way
of rentals from a third party, after the use of reasonablediligence to obtain a tenant at
the best rental possible under circumstances of the case).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I2.2

80

Whelan: Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing with a Te

1997]

ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LEASES

363

ised by, a substitute tenant) or (ii) the amount the landlord would
have received had it mitigated its damages (the rent the original tenant contracted to pay less the fair market value of the premises for the
remainder of the lease term). The imposition of a duty to mitigate
should not substantially change either of these measures of damages.
1. New Rule: A Landlord Now Has a Duty to Mitigate
In 1997, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature both
recognized that a landlord has a duty to mitigate its damages under
Texas law. But the duty each recognized is not identical and some of
the differences are significant.
The duty to mitigate is triggered in slightly different circumstances.
Under Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., a landlord "must have" a duty

to mitigate when suing for anticipatory breach.47 6 The duty to mitigate also arises if a tenant abandons the premises in violation of the
lease and the landlord either actually reenters the premises or has the
right to do so without terminating the lease.4 77 Under the mitigation

statute, however, a landlord has the duty to mitigate its damages
whenever the tenant abandons the premises in violation of the
lease.4 78

The statute creates a dilemna for a landlord that Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. anticipates but avoids. Because a landlord does not
have a common law right to reenter the premises without risking termination of the lease, Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. expressly ex-

empts a landlord from the duty to mitigate if the lease does not give
the landlord the right to reenter.4 7 9 The mitigation statute does not.
Unless such an exemption is implied, the mitigation statute places a
landlord who does not have an express right to reenter and relet in an
untenable position. If, on the one hand, the landlord does not reenter
and relet, its right to recover damages from the tenant will be compromised because the landlord would breach its duty to mitigate. If, on
the other hand, the landlord reenters in an attempt to mitigate its
damages, the landlord would breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
forfeiting the right to recover any damages. One hopes the mitigation
statute will be construed to avoid this absurd result.
While the supreme court attempted to define the duty to mitigate,
the legislature did not. In Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., the

supreme court stated that a landlord has a duty to make "objectively
reasonable" efforts to fill the premises.480 This duty, however, is not
476. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293,
299-300 (Tex. 1997).

477. See id. at 299.
478. See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006).
479. See id.
480. Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 299.
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absolute-a landlord is not required to fill the premises with any willing
tenant. The substitute tenant, according to the court, must be "suita'
ble."481
The supreme court's explanation is only slightly more helpful
than the legislature's silence.
The supreme court also explained the effect of a landlord's breach
of its duty to mitigate more clearly than did the legislature. The
supreme court stated in Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. that a landlord's breach of the duty to mitigate does not give rise to a cause of
action against the landlord.48 Instead, a landlord's failure to mitigate
bars its recovery against a breaching tenant only to the extent that the
landlord's damages reasonably could have been avoided, and when a
landlord does mitigate, any damages the landlord actually avoids by
reletting will reduce its recovery."' An ambiguity in the no waiver
section of the mitigation statute raises the prospect that the statute
may give a tenant a cause of action and a defense. It states "A provision of a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord
from a liability or duty under this statute is void., 4 84 It may now take
additional decisions to settle an issue the supreme court already decided in Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. in a manner consistent with
decades of contractual mitigation cases.
On one issue, the supreme court and the legislature pronounced apparently contradictory rules. In Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., the
supreme court stated that the duty to mitigate applies in commercial
leases, unless the landlord and tenant contract otherwise. 485 But the
legislature declared that "[a]ny provision in a lease that purports to
waive or exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under this statute is
void. ' 486 The statutory no waiver rule, however, only applies to leases
entered into on or after September 1, 1997.487
Finally, the court, but not the legislature, prescribed certain procedural rules for putting a landlord's duty to mitigate in issue. 488 If a
tenant merely wishes to receive credits for any amounts generated by
the landlord's efforts to mitigate, the tenant may file only a general
denial. If, on the other hand, a tenant wishes to assert that its landlord
breached its duty to mitigate, the tenant must plead this as an affirmative defense. And the tenant bears the burden of proving the landlord
481.
482.
483.
484.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at TEX.

PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 91.006).

485. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 299.
486. Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg. R.S., S.B. 1678, § 8 (to be codified at
PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006).
487. See id.
488. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., 948 S.W.2d at 299-300.
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mitigated or failed to mitigate and the amount of any credit to which
the tenant is entitled.489
2.

Contractually Defined Mitigation Obligations

One response to Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. is to define con-

tractually the scope of any duty to mitigate in the lease. A mitigation
clause should cover, among other things: (i) when the landlord's duty
begins (e.g., after the tenant formally relinquishes any claim to possession); (ii) whether the landlord has the option to let other available
space before becoming obligated to relet the premises of the defaulting tenant; (iii) the creditworthiness of the substitute tenant; (iv)
whether the landlord has an obligation to relet the premises on less
favorable terms than comparable space in the landlord's property or
in comparable properties; (v) the formulas for applying any rent received to the rental deficiency and other such issues; (vi) whether the
landlord must relet when other comparable spaces are being offered
for rent by the landlord; (vii) whether the landlord must relet at less
than the then fair market value, which may affect tenant mix; and
(viii) whether the landlord must advance payment for any tenant improvements required by a substitute tenant, lease commissions, or
other costs associated with reletting.
E. Waiver

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.49 °
Although often treated as boilerplate, a well-drafted no waiver clause
may eliminate some obstacles to recovery that landlords frequently
encounter in the lease enforcement process.49 ' In Taherzadeh v. Clements,4 92 the court of appeals, citing a no waiver provision in the lease,
rejected the tenant's claim that the landlord, by previously accepting
late rental payments, waived its right to place the tenant in default for
failing to timely pay rent. The no waiver provision read: "One or
more waivers of any covenant, term or condition of this lease by either
party shall not be construed as a waiver of a subsequent breach of the
same covenant, term or condition. 4 9 3 Under controlling Texas law,

according to the court,
such a clause precludes the defense of waiver
494
as a matter of law.
489. See id.
490. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Benton, 729 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. 1987).
491. See, e.g., Crain v. Southern Warehouse Corp., 612 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (stating that no waiver provision in lease,
which provided "nor shall pursuit of any remedy herein provided constitute forfeiture
or waiver of any rent due hereunder to the landlord hereunder . . . [,]" prevented
notice to quit from causing forfeiture of lease).
492. 781 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1986).
493. Id. at 1098 (emphasis added).
494. See id. But see Winslow v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 849 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1992, no writ) (stating that landlord's conduct may waive nonwaiver

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

83

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

CONCLUSION

Recovering possession and recovering damages from a delinquent
tenant need not be mutually exclusive remedies. A lawful eviction
will affect a landlord's measure of damages. It ordinarily will not prevent a landlord from recovering them. But an unlawful eviction will
almost certainly result in the forfeiture of the landlord's right to recover any damages and, worse, may give rise to claims by the tenant
against the landlord. Appreciating the importance of lawfully recovering possession, and understanding the effect of doing so upon a
landlord's monetary remedies, are the first steps along the long and
sometimes winding road that leads to successful evictions and monetary recoveries.

clause); Wendlandt v. Sommers Drug Stores Co., 551 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1977, no writ) (holding that tenant did not breach covenant to pay rent timely
in view of landlord's prior acceptance, without protest, of late rent payments); C.G.
Murphy Co. v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that "upon a theory that the occurrence of a cause of forfeiture
gives the lessor an election to declare the lease at an end or to overlook the breach
and allow the lease to remain in force, it is generally held that the acceptance of rent
which accrues after a breach of a covenant or condition of the lease, with knowledge
of such breach, constitutes a waiver of the right to forfeit the lease on account of such
breach.").
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